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OF BLOGS, EBOOKS, AND BROADBAND: ACCESS
TO DIGITAL MEDIA AS A
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT

HannibalTravis*

I.

INTRODUCTION: DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A politics of Internet freedom has recently achieved cultural
prominence. Legal theorists have described this new Internet politics as a
form of digital libertarianism, cultural environmentalism, or identity
politics uploaded from the offline world.' This politics is critical of
attempts to censor bloggers or the Web, shut down promising new
"speech-enabling" technologies like peer-to-peer ("p2p") file sharing
or
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1999. The author thanks Professor Eric M. Freedman of Hofstra Law School
and Majorie Heins of the Brennan Center for Justice for selecting this Article for inclusion in the
Hofstra Law School conference, "Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of
Media Reform," and the resulting symposium issue in the Hofstra Law Review. He also thanks
Professor Howard Wasserman for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, Professor
Jerome Barron for providing the inspiration for many of the ideas that follow, and the Hofstra Law
Review's editors for their careful and diligent work.
1. For a telling account of digital libertarianism as a system of thought combining
Enlightenment values with an awareness of the Internet's ability to evade government censorship
and official monopolies, see James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 177-80, 182-83 (1997). For influential discussions of
cyberspace law and politics as a replay of debates that the environmental movement emphasized
concerning tendencies toward unlimited exploitation of private property and resulting injuries to the
commons and to the quality of life of all, see James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:
Environmentalismfor the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 95-97, 108-12 (1997); see also James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33, 69-71 (2003). For a more recent treatment of this theme, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 383-

459 (2006), available at http://www.congo-education.net/wealth-of-networks/ch- l.htm. For
persuasive critiques of intellectual property as a threat to autonomous formation of individual and
group identities in postmodem, globalizing societies, see ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL
LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 30-31, 55, 88-

129 (1998); Madhavi Sunder, 1P3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 265-66, 276-280, 303, 307-09, 318-25
(2006).
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search engines for books, or repeal laws ensuring that the Internet
operates based on principles of nondiscrimination, interoperability, and
2
open access to information.
Digital media accessible over the Internet are more First
Amendment-friendly than traditional print and broadcast media, for
several mutually reinforcing and interrelated reasons. First, like the
pamphleteering and epistolary discourse of the eighteenth century,
digital media avoid the strategic bottleneck power exercised by owners
of printing presses or television infrastructure. 3 Second, they are more
often open to ownership and control by women, young people, the
politically unpopular, members of minority ethnic or religious groups,
and those lacking official credentials or renowned expertise in a specific
subject area.4 Third, they disseminate more diverse and truthful speech
2. See, e.g., Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.,
109th Cong. 7-9 (2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
at
available
Inc.),
Google,
dbname=109_senate hearings&docid=f:30115.pdf; WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 92-133 (2004); MARJORIE HEINS &
TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT
CONTROL 4-5, 8 (2005); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 62-79 (2004), available at

http://www.ibiblio.org/ebooks/Lessig/Free-Culture/Free%20Culture.htm#p62;

LAWRENCE LESSIG,

THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 177-205, 215-17

(2001); Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale & Kim Weatherall, Beyond Napster: UsingAntitrust Law to
Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 506 (2002); Paul
Ganley & Ben Allgrove, Net Neutrality: A User's Guide, 22 COMP. L. & SEC. REP. 454, 455, 458,
460 (2006); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (Or Should) In Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575,
636-37 (2005); Alfred E. Kahn, Telecommunications: The Transitionfrom Regulation to Antitrust, 5
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 159, 184-88 (2006); Christian Coalition & MoveOn.org,
Advertisement (On Net Neutrality), N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at A 17; Lawrence Lessig, Comment,
Congress Must Keep Broadband Competition Alive, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at 17, available at
=
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a27bdb 16-5ecd- Il db-afac-0000779e2340,_i_rssPage
73adc504-2ffa-1 lda-ba9f-00000e251 lc8.html; Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, Op-Ed.,
No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A23.
3. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC
(Turner 11), 512 U.S. 622, 626, 637-39 (1994); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143,
146, 149, 155-56 (1951); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 846-48, 855-58 (6th Cir.
1979). Digital media supplant traditional media's communications model of"one to many" with the
Internet's model of "many to many," which allows every reader to become an author, direct
distribution to replace intermediary censorship and editorial control, and public-interested
publication to challenge commercial dictates. See MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE

SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 9 (1998); Margaret Chon, Erasing Race?: A Critical Race Feminist
View ofInternet Identity-Shifting, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 439, 446 (2000); Niva Elkin-Koren,
Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 256-59 (1996); Sunder, supra note 1, at 276-77.
AND

4. See, e.g., DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, How WOMEN
11, 20, 38 (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/
MEN USE THE INTERNET 2,

pdfs/PIP.Women andMen.online.pdf (66% of American women are online, 8% have their own
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faster than the traditional media, which too often operate as a sounding
board for government officials.5 Finally, at their best they evade the
blogs, and 11% have their own Web sites); AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH FOX, PEW INTERNET
& AMERICAN

LIFE PROJECT,

BLOGGERS ii

(2006), http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP%20

Bloggers%20Report%2OJuly%2019%202006.pdf ("The blogging population is young, evenly split
between women and men, and racially diverse.... [11% of bloggers] are African-American, 19%
are English-speaking Hispanic and 10% identify as some other race."). Assuming that there are 12
million American blogs, that means about 6 million American women, 1.3 million AfricanAmericans, 2.3 million Latinos/Latinas, and 1.2 million Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and
others have a voice in digital media. Television news sources, talk show hosts and guests, as well as
newspaper editors, by contrast, are overwhelmingly male, European-American, and (for television
but not newspapers) Republican. See Carole Ashkinaze, A Matter of Opinion: Female Pundits Are
Still Missing from the Media, MS. MAG., Summer 2005, at 17, available at
http://www.msmagazine.com/summer2005/opinion.asp; Steve Rendall & Tara Broughel, Amplifying
Officials,
Squelching
Dissent,
EXTRA!,
May/June
2003,
available
at
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1145; Kay Semion, Who We Are and What We Do: An
Internet-researched Update, MASTHEAD, Autumn
2006, at
12-13,
available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3771/is_200610/ai_n16756010; MEDIA MATTERS FOR
AMERICA, IF IT'S SUNDAY, IT'S CONSERVATIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUNDAY TALK SHOW

GUESTS
ON
ABC,
CBS,
AND
NBC,
1997-2005
1 (2006),
available at
http://mediamatters.org/static/pdf/MMFASunday-ShowReport.pdf;
Press Release, Fairness &
Accuracy in Reporting ("FAIR"), CommonDreams.org, Who's On the News?: Study Shows
Network
News
Sources
Skew
White,
Male
&
Elite
(May
21,
2002),
http://www.commondreams.org/news2002/0521-03.htm. The ideal of cyberspace, utopian and
overly romantic though it may be, has been described as "a world that all may enter without
privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth .... a
world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear
of being coerced into silence or conformity." John Perry Barlow, A Declarationof the Independence
of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.htm. Notably, over
forty percent of relatively low-income Americans have posted information to the Internet, surely
many more than have been published by the traditional media. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,
Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1563 (2005).
5. In the twentieth century, American newspapers, broadcast networks, and movie studios
apparently reached an understanding with politicians in Washington to the effect that the
government's perspective on important issues would be amplified in the public press, while
dissenters would be denied effective access to the media. See Rendall & Broughel, supra note 4
("Since the invasion of Iraq began in March, official voices have dominated U.S. network
newscasts, while opponents of the war have been notably underrepresented, according to a
study .... [V]iewers were more than six times as likely to see a pro-war source as one who was
anti-war; with U.S. guests alone, the ratio increases to 25 to 1."); Jon Whiten, If News From Iraq Is
Bad, It's Coming From
U.S. Officials, EXTRA!,
Feb.
2004,
available at
http://www.fair.org/index.phppage=1167 (stating that seventy-six percent of "on-camera sources
appearing in stories about Iraq on the nightly network newscasts-ABC World News Tonight, CBS
Evening News and NBC Nightly News-in the month of October 2003 .. .were current or former
government or military officials .... By allowing U.S. officials and appointees to make up 73
percent of total sources, the networks clearly promoted the official line on the war and minimized
dissenting views .... Seventy-nine percent of the [sources who were] current U.S. civilian officials
were Republicans .... ); James Q. Wilson, Editorial, The Press at War, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov.
6, 2006, http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=l 10009203; (noting that "television
accounts between 1962 and 1968 were not critical of the American effort in Vietnam," only shifting
after the Tel Offensive in January 1968 indicated a "stalemate"); Angela Woodall, Survey: U.S.
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bureaucratic permission and clearance culture of the traditional media,
which stifle creativity by censoring and raising the cost of speech.6
Despite their superior capacity to fulfill First Amendment values,
digital media are undergoing widespread censorship as the Supreme
Court increasingly construes the First Amendment as a privilege of large
corporations to influence politicians and advertise dangerous products,7
rather than a right of unpopular citizens to criticize public officials.
Apr. 5, 2005,
Media Censors Iraq Reporting, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.upi.com/Intemationallntelligence/Survey-US-media/censors-iraq-reporting/
20050401-033245-1212r/ ("The news media are self-censoring reports about Iraq because of
concern for public reaction to graphic images and details about death and torture, according to a
survey of 210 U.S. and international journalists ....There is an 'unspoken rule' against publishing
").
images of what would be horrifying, such as [dead bodies] ....
6. The verb "censor" in this context refers to deterring potential speakers from making
particular statements by threatening them with subsequent legal penalties, and not simply to the
verb's original meaning-pre-publication review of a work by an official for compliance with the
ideological aims of the state. Compare, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (using
broader definition of"censor"), with Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1961)
(using narrower definition of the term). For depictions of how traditional media undergo censorship,
thus defined, as a result of an intellectual property clearance culture, see KEMBREW MCLEOD,
FREEDOM

OF EXPRESSION®: OVERZEALOUS

COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF

CREATIVITY 62-113, 133-58 (2005) (focusing on how music sampling clearances censor and raise
costs of musicians' artistry); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 388, 401, 406, 408-11
(1999) (describing how companies that own many copyrights exercise bureaucratic control over
creation of books and their distribution to the public); Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1026, 1058-71 (2006) (focusing on films and classroom teaching); PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE &
PETER JASZI, CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
4
(2004),
FOR
DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS
RIGHTS
CLEARANCE
CULTURE

http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/printable-rightsreport.pdf (focusing on
documentary films).
7. Compare, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 2485-86, 2500 (2006) (holding that a
statute limiting corporate payments to public officials that could influence their positions and public
acts was unconstitutional under the First Amendment), Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 533, 553-71, 586-90, 599 (2001) (extending First Amendment protections to corporate
advertising of tobacco that threatened to cause children to become addicted), Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 558-59, 571-72 (1980) (extending First
Amendment protections to corporate advertising that threatened to increase consumers' electricity
bills), E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-40 (1961)
(declaring that the First Amendment protects "corporate aggrandizement" via lobbying for
monopolies), and Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (remanding for
determination by FCC whether federal limits on corporate broadcasters' ability to censor political
speech violated corporations' First Amendment rights), with Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 257576 (2006) (contending that the First Amendment did not prohibit prison officials from censoring
individual prisoner's access to newspapers and magazines), Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951,
1955, 1962 (2006) (explaining that the First Amendment did not prohibit firing public employee for
exposing unconstitutional government action), Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3
(1990) (holding that the First Amendment did not necessarily protect an individual author against
defamation suit brought by public official and premised upon author's expressions of opinion about
a local controversy in a newspaper), id. at 34-36 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting)

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/17
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Since the Supreme Court's admonition in 2003 that the First Amendment
is no license to reproduce excerpts of copyrighted work, copyright
owners have sent out millions of demand letters to Internet Service
Providers ("ISP"), demanding that digital content be deleted from the
Internet without judicial oversight or jury trial. 8 Since the United States
Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN") made compulsory private arbitration of
(criticizing majority for striking at "heart" of First Amendment's protections for political debate by
individuals), Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263, 266 (1988) (upholding
school's censorship of articles dealing with pregnancy and divorce), Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985) (censoring political magazine's expos& of President
Harold Ford's bombing of Cambodia and pardon of Richard Nixon), City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 791-92, 817 (1984) (upholding ordinance prohibiting posting
of political signs on utility poles), Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
39, 55 (1983) (upholding censorship of public school teachers' communications with one another on
union matters), Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-41, 154 (1983) (upholding termination of
assistant district attorney for "insubordination" in the form of questioning politicization of legal
obligations), Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831, 840 (1976) (upholding censorship of political
speeches, demonstrations, and literature in a military context), and United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 369, 386 (1968) (upholding prosecution of individual for expressing opposition to
Vietnam War by burning a draft card).
8. For statements of the dubious proposition that the First Amendment confers no license to
reproduce excerpts of copyrighted work, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (no First
Amendment license to infringe copyrights where "Congress has not altered the traditional contours
of copyright protection"); In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 143 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("With
respect to copyright protection, the first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A study
of demand letters sent to Google and other digital media firms found that such letters pose a "serious
problem for Internet speech" because nearly a third insist on the deletion of content that likely does
not violate any copyright. Internet Study Finds Questionable Use of Cease-and-DesistNotices,
FACULTY FOOTNOTES (USC Gould School of Law, Los Angeles, Cal.), Fall 2006, at 2, available at
http://law.usc.edu/assets/docs/FINAL-footnotesO6.pdf, see JENNIFER M. URBAN & LAURA QUILTER,
EFFICIENT PROCESS OR 'CHILLING EFFECTS'? TAKEDOWN NOTICES UNDER SECTION 512 OF THE
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 2-3 (2005), http://static.chillingeffects.org/Urban-Quilter-

512-summary.pdf. One online intellectual property protection company boasted about sending out
one million "automated" demands for deletion of allegedly infringing content every month. See
BayTSP Corp., Fighting Online Software Piracy-What Works in 2005 (2005),
http://web.archive.org/web/20050305165944/http://www.baytsp.com/
downloads2/SW white_2005.pdf;

BAYTSP CORP., TRENDS RELATING TO USE OF P2P FILE-

SHARING
SYSTEMS
(2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/filesharing/presentations/
ishikawa.pdf. Another firm offers to "automatically create a Take-Down Campaign" for "thousands
of files" of content identified in advance by a copyright owner, which it says will result in demands
for deletion being automatically sent to thousands of Web sites, p2p software providers, etc.
GLOBAL

FILE

REGISTRY,

TECHNICAL

WHITE

PAPER

9,

19

(May

26,

2006),

http://www.globalfileregistry.com/assets/GlobalFileRegistry-White-Paper.pdf. These take-down
demand letters, even if not automated, are subject to erroneous charges and deterrence of lawful
speech. See Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 368 (2003);
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1380 (2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of
PrivateCopying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 661-62 (2005).
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Internet trademark disputes into a precondition of obtaining an Internet
address, thousands of Web pages have been deleted from cyberspace by
arbitration panels that systematically disfavor free speech defenses. 9 And
since the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and the courts
cast aside warnings that deregulated oligopolistic control of high-speed
Internet infrastructure threatened universal access to information, the
digital divide has widened between rich and poor, suburban and rural,
and majority and minority ethnic groups.10 Commentators blame the
absence of ubiquitous city-supported high-speed Internet networks and
open access rules for the fact that broadband access in the United States
lags far behind access in nations in East Asia and northern Europe,
which have many municipal networks and open access rules."'
9. World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") arbitrators have found for the
complainant in eighty-four percent of over 7,000 distinct arbitrations that have been filed seeking
deletion of a Web site associated with an allegedly infringing domain name, a percentage that would
be truly remarkable in ordinary civil litigation. See Press Release, World Intellectual Property
Organization, WIPO Handles Its 25,000th Domain Name Case (Oct. 16, 2006),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/wipo-pr_2006_464.html. Another arbitration provider
has administered over 7200 domain name arbitrations. See National Arbitration Forum, National
Arbitration Forum Issues Three Decisions on Internet TrademarkDomain Name Disputes, Nov. 21,
=
2006, http://www.adrforum.com/newsroom.aspx?&itemlD l 11 &news=3. A single arbitration may
challenge many domain names. See, e.g., Sallie Mae, Inc. v. Sansone, Case No. D2005-0368 (WIPO
at
available
11,
2005),
July
Ctr.,
Mediation
Arb.
&
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2005/d2005-0368.htm (twenty-three domain names);
Wachovia Corp. v. Flanders, Case No. D2003-0596 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr., Sept. 19, 2003),
(three
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisionsthtml/2003/d2003-0596.htm
domain names). For articles describing the enactment and perceived unfairness of the domain name
arbitration system, including the high percentage of cases decided by default, see, for example,
Jessica Litman, Electronic Commerce and Free Speech, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION 37-42 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); Jacqueline D.
Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1361, 1371-77, 1397-1404 (2005); Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The
Emerging Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the
Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 30-36 (2005); MILTON MUELLER, CONVERGENCE CTR., SUCCESS
BY DEFAULT: A NEW PROFILE OF DOMAIN NAME TRADEMARK DISPUTES UNDER ICANN'S UDRP
1-2 (2002), http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/markle-report-final.pdf; Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An
Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP 1-3 (Aug. 2001),
available at http://aix 1.uottawa.ca/-geist/geistudrp.pdf. But See, e.g., INTA INTERNET COMM., THE
UDRP BY ALL ACCOUNTS WORKS EFFECTIVELY-REBUTTAL TO ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
PROFESSOR MICHAEL GEIST IN 'FAIR.COM?' AND 'FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM?' 1-3 (May 6,

http://www.inta.org/downloads/
at
available
2002),
tap_udrp.2paper2002.pdf.
10. See Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal Broadband Access as Antitrust and
Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1697, 1728-36, 1751-59, 1777-78 (2006).
11. See Jesse Drucker, For U.S. Consumers, Broadband Service Is Slow and Expensive,
WALL. ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at B1; Robert McChesney & John Podesta, Let There Be Wi-Fi,
WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 15, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/
features/2006/0601.podesta.html; FLORIDA MN. ELEC. ASS'N ("FMEA"), THE CASE FOR

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/17
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It has been well known for some time that First Amendment rights
may be implicated by overbroad copyright and trademark laws, or
concentrated private power over information infrastructure. For several
decades, judges and scholars have been criticizing developments in
intellectual property and antitrust law that threaten the public's ability to
contribute and enjoy access to political and cultural discourse
12 of an
character.
evolutionary
and
dynamic,
multicultural,
uninhibited,
MUNICIPAL BROADBAND IN FLORIDA 9 (2005), http://www.baller.com/pdfs/fmea-white-paper.pdf.
12. Judicial opinions in this tradition include: San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 569 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 590-98 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-82 (1977); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005);
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004); Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803, 806 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Rogers v. Gramaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d. Cir.
1989)); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166, substituted opinion at 268
F.3d 1257, 1277 (1 th Cir. 2001); Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513-14 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (Ist Cir.
1987); Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646, 653-55 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966); Hawaii v.
Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1250 (D. Haw. 1999); Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v.
FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1144-52 (C.D. Cal. 1976). For scholarship in this tradition, see, for
example, Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the
Protections of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Charles C. Goetsch, Parody as Free
Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 39 (1980); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987). Since the late 1980s in particular,
scholars have been much more willing to take the First Amendment harms inflicted by intellectual
property law seriously. See, e.g., LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 2, at 187-90, 196-99;
Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 11 (1987); C. Edwin
Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 893, 900, 908 (2002); Julie E.
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and
Copyright Law and Its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS. & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998); Dorean M.
Koenig, Joe Camel and the First Amendment: The Dark Side of Copyrighted and TrademarkProtectedIcons, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 803 (1994); Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The
FirstAmendment, Internet Intermediaries,and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
11 (2006); David Lange, Copyright and the Constitution in the Age of Intellectual Property, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 119, 133-34 (1993); Arlen W. Langvardt, TrademarkRights and FirstAmendment
Wrongs: Protectingthe Former Without Committing the Latter, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 633, 651-52
(1993); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 169-70 (2003); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody:A
Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1079-81 (1986); Alfred C. Yen, A
First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/ExpressionDichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total
Concept and Feel, " 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 432-33 (1989); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information
as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 665, 681 (1992) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Information as Speech]; Diane Leenheer
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I hope to advance the scholarship in this area, but not by basing a
First Amendment right of access to digital media on an ad hoc balancing
test or variant of intermediate scrutiny derived from United States v.
O'Brien,13 as have other scholars. 14 Instead, I aim to show that the rubric
of originalism provides the most persuasive, consistent, and principled
basis on which to establish First Amendment limits to efforts by private
entities to censor digital media using government-issued monopolies.
My argument takes its inspiration from three lines of scholarship.
First, I rely on a rich tradition of discourse explaining how digital media
represent a fulfillment of the libertarian and radically democratic vision
of the First Amendment. 15 Intellectual property scholarship evoking
eighteenth century freedoms against twentieth century regulation and
management of speech and the press also inspires my defense of digital

Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 348-49 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Is There a Right].
13. 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 635, 662,
664-65 (1994); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (developing
intermediate scrutiny standard based on.O'Brien precedent).
14. The studies that I have learned the most from about how copyright and other intellectual
property rights might be subjected to First Amendment balancing and "intermediate scrutiny" under
O'Brien and its progeny include Benkler, supra note 6, at 372, 372 n.83, 413 n.230 (conducting
First Amendment analysis of copyright and other intellectual property laws using test articulated in
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, and applied in Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 665); Yochai Benkler, Through
the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 178-80 (2003); Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of
Databases Can Be Constitutional,28 U. DAYTON.L. REV. 159, 200-02 (2002) (providing a similar
analysis of legislation granting copyright-like protections to databases of facts or other information);
Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common
With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42
B.C. L. REV. 1, 4, 42-43, 63-78 (2000); see also Brief of Petitioners at 39, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No.
01-618
(U.S.
Sup.
Ct.
filed
May
20,
2002),
available
at
htty://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opening-brief.pdf;
Opening Brief of
Appellants at 17, 33, Eldred v. Reno, No. 99-5430 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2000), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvreno/appealbrief.html.
15. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 122-86 (1999);
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 2, at 120-41, 177-217, 249-59 (discussing the freedomenhancing characteristics of cyberspace, and the consequent government efforts at control over
digital content, and arguing against "perfect control"); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment and the
Internet: Will Free Speech PrinciplesApplied to the Media Apply Here?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 713, 715-16 (1996); James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton
Years, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 341, 349, 351 (2000); Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 21819, 235-67; Fraser, supra note 12, at 36; Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social
Movements and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 124, 135,
137, 170 (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom ofImagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 33 (2002); Solveig Singleton, Reviving a FirstAmendment Absolutism for the Internet,
3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 282-83, 321 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1761, 1789-91 (1995).
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media against censorship.' 6 Second, I draw on the insight by prominent
jurists and scholars that originalist applications of the Constitution and
Bill of Rights are frequently more protective of liberty and democracy17
than either ad hoc balancing or judicial findings of "reasonableness."
16. See, e.g., LESSIG, CODE, supra note 15, at 139 (calling for balanced intellectual property
laws that "re-create the original space for liberty" that early American law guaranteed); Boyle, supra
note 1,at 55-56 (urging revival of "anti-monopolistic" tradition of "free-trade skepticism about
intellectual property" in eighteenth and nineteenth century, which stressed overbroad monopolies'
censorious "control over our collective culture" and concomitant "harm to the fabric of the republic
caused by great concentrations of wealth and power," and as represented by James Madison,
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Babington Macaulay, and Adam Smith); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 15058 (1998) (analyzing eighteenth and nineteenth century copyright law to assess whether injunctions
in intellectual property cases violate First Amendment); L. Ray Patterson, Presentation at the
University of Dayton Law Review Symposium: Copyright Protectionfor Computer Databases, CDROMS and Factual Compilations, in 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 413, 413 (1992) (criticizing
"overextension" of copyright due to the departure from eighteenth century understanding that
copyright was a statutory monopoly, not an absolute property right).
17. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the notion that "laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a
congressional or judicial balancing process"). Justice Black further explained:
[The majority of the Court believes that] neither the First Amendment nor any other
provision of the Bill of Rights should be enforced unless the Court believes it is
reasonableto do so. Not only does this violate the genius of our written Constitution, but it
runs expressly counter to the injunction to Court and Congress made by Madison when he
introduced the Bill of Rights. "If [the Bill of Rights is] incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption
of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of
rights."
Id. at 143 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)); see also ROGER K.
NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 130-31 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that reasonableness tests and
balancing are inconsistent with the "philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," who opposed "those who
believe in restricting and shackling the human intellect"); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak
From Times to Time: FirstAmendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL.
L. REV. 935, 939-41 (1968); Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095,
1137 (2005) (criticizing ad hoc balancing in First Amendment context as an "unexamined, un-selfconscious intuitive inquiry [that] can easily be influenced by factors that judges ought not consider,
such as the ideology of the speaker or the perceived merits of the political movement to which he
belongs").
I find the following books and articles to be exemplary of the fruitfulness of criticizing
existing constitutional doctrine and engaging in originalist expositions of the Bill of Rights. See,
e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); Akhil

Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against States?, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV.
1221 (2002); Akhil Amar & Vikram Amar, Guns and the Constitution: Telling the Right Second
2001,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
2,
Amendment Story, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Nov.
amar/20011102.html; Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism: Original Intent for Liberals (And
for Conservatives and Moderates, Too), SLATE, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2126680/;
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Justice William J. Brennan in particular proved the advantage of a
careful attention to the intent and historical context of the First
Amendment over either ad hoc or "definitional" balancing. He
introduced the review of legislation for its chilling effect on protected
speech due to overbreadth and vagueness, rather than simply asking
whether the First Amendment allowed regulation of the category of
speech affected.' 8
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Akhil Reed
Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 124 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifteenth Amendment and "PoliticalRights," 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2225 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV. 26 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, The Supreme Court]; see also
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 564-633 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting) (superseded by U.S. Const.
amend. XIII, §§ 1-2); JOHN NICHOLS, THE GENIUS OF IMPEACHMENT: THE FOUNDERS' CURE FOR
ROYALISM (2006); Richard Delgado, Inequality "From the Top ":Applying an Ancient Prohibition
to an Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32 UCLA L. REV. 100, 110-12, 125-28 (1984);
Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007).
18. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 272, 275, 279-80 (1964)
(holding that although libel and defamation may be legitimate subjects of state regulation, such
regulation needs to be limited in cases involving public officials to false statements made with
"actual malice," so that "'the field of free debate"' will have "'breathing space' and remain
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." The court noted that "free public discussion of the
stewardship of public officials was . . ., in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the
American form of government."); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969)
(although inciting violent acts may not be worthy of protection in itself, regulation of such
incitement needs to be restricted by First Amendment to cases involving advocacy intended to and
likely to cause "imminent lawless action," or it might "sweep[] within its condemnation speech
which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control"); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 59-60 (1965) (invalidating law prohibiting exhibition of films not approved by state
licensing boards, which might deter exhibitors from showing films containing protected expression);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (explaining that although a law might be addressed to
a form of speech or conduct subject to reasonable regulation, the law's overbreadth and vagueness
may be "objectionable" because the "threat of sanctions may deter the[] exercise" of the freedom of
speech, which is "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society," and
"need[s] breathing space to survive"); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959)
(overturning law criminalizing the possession of obscene books that might deter booksellers from
carrying lawful books); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 528-29 (1958) (invalidating a loyalty
oath aimed at violent sedition whose overbreadth and vagueness would deter legitimate speech as
well); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 34-37, 68-73
(1998) (explaining that Justice Brennan recognized broad First Amendment protections in areas that
other Justices regarded as being beyond the reach of the First Amendment by definition or as a result
of a balancing of state and individual interests, including treason and sedition, unlawful associations,
obscenity, and defamation); ROBERT D. RICHARDS, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE OPEN: MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S LEGACY TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 19-25, 47-68, 98-100, 110-12 (1994)
(stating that Justice Brennan defended against government censorship of previously unprotected acts
such as publishing classified information, exhibiting motion pictures without a license, inciting
violence, lewd and obscene speech, and defamation); Brennan Center for Justice, Memorials:
Resolution Adopted by the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States to Record Our Deep
Respect
and
Affection
for
Justice
William
J.
Brennan,
Jr.,
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Finally, I take my cue from recent Bill of Rights precedents
guaranteeing, as a minimum standard, the rights and freedoms that the
framers and ratifiers of our Constitution would expect it to preserve in
light of the common law. These precedents utilize the statements of the
framers, and the contours of the common law at the time of ratification
of the Bill of Rights in 1791, to preserve trial by jury at least as
extensively as it was available at that time, ban punishments then
considered cruel or unusual at common law or otherwise, guarantee a
"wall of separation" between sectarianism and state power, find searches
and seizures to be "unreasonable" if they were so regarded at the time of
the founding, and defend the privilege against self-incrimination against
recent innovations 1 9 Of course, the Bill of Rights may still need
translation and updating for changed facts, 20 but the rights they
http://www.brennancenter.org/article.asp?key-375 (last visited June 24, 2007) (indicating that
Justice Brennan vindicated free speech rights against traditional restrictions on publishing classified
information, engaging in indecent speech, defamation, and broadcasting in violation of licensing
requirements).
19. See, e.g., Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65 (2000) (explaining that the privilege against
self-incrimination depends on its scope and "historical foundation.., in 1791, when the Bill of
Rights was adopted, [and] in 1868 when, according to our jurisprudence, the Fourteenth
Amendment extended... [it] to the States"); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) ("In
determining whether a particular governmental action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire
first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when
the Amendment was framed."); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347-48
(1998) ("The Seventh Amendment provides that '[in Suits at common law.... the right of trial by
' [It] applies.., to [all] 'actions brought to enforce statutory rights that
jury shall be preserved ....
are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late
18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty."'); Lee v.
concurring); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600-02 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
399, 405 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment proscribes at a minimum "those modes or acts
of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted"); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947) (declaring that First
Amendment's "'wall of separation' between sectarianism and government would be violated by
government funding of religious schools) (citation omitted); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886) (articulating as "the true doctrine on the subject of searches and seizures, and. . . the true
criteria of the reasonable and 'unreasonable' character of such seizures," principles of common law
that prevailed "when the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States were
penned and adopted"); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238 (2005) (based on
"constitutional tradition assimilated from the common law," under federal law any "particular fact
[that] must be proved in order to sentence a defendant within a particular range" must be proved to a
jury under Sixth Amendment); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (holding that the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses extends at least as far as under common law in 1791);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (stating that based on practice at common law,
"any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
20. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 18 (2005) (suggesting that jurists should, in applying the Constitution, "project the
purposes which inspired it" onto "contemporary conditions, social, industrial and political, of the
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guaranteed at the time of ratification constitute an irreducible minimum
standard.
II.

PARODY BLOGS AND ACCESS TO DIGITAL AUDIENCES

A.

Censorshipby Trademark Law in the Blogosphere

A cynical Internet dictionary defines an "author" as a "writer with
connections in the publishing industry., 21 A blogger, by contrast, has
been defined as a writer who, presumably lacking such connections,
leverages Internet technology to "publish[] his or her thoughts each day
for the entire online world to read., 22 Despite an Internet joke that
blogging dates to ancient Rome, the first blog was a "What's New"
update published on the Web by HTML creator Tim Bemers-Lee in
1992,23 or the first Web-based diaries in the 1980s or 1990s. 24 Blogging
has grown exponentially, with an estimated half million blogs by early
2002, two million by late 2002, four million by 2003, thirty million by
2005, and more than fifty million by 2006.25 The public discourse about
the Iraq war spurred the growth and visibility of blogs as an alternative
community to be affected"); Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 17, at 78-80 (suggesting that
Supreme Court precedent has valuable role to play in filling in gaps in the Bill of Rights,
interpreting ambiguous terms, accounting for actual practice and empirical fact, and ensuring
workability); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171 n.32 (1993)
(collecting a long list of scholars who acknowledge need to translate Bill of Rights to account for
changed circumstances, new facts or technologies, differing society and culture, etc.).
21. RICK
BAYAN,
THE
CYNIC'S
DICTIONARY
25
(1994),
available at
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/-ncb/funnies/cynics.
22. Jim Calloway, Of Blogs, Bloggers and Blawgs, LAW PRACTICE TODAY, Apr. 2003,
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mtk042303 lhtml.
23. See Posting of Dave Winer to UserLand.com: The History of Weblogs,
http://www.userland.com/theHistoryOfWeblogs (Sept. 9, 2001, 12:21p.m.).
24. See, e.g., Paul S. Gutman, Say What?: Blogging and Employment Law in Conflict, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 145, 145 (2003) ("Simply put, the first blogs listed websites visited by the
writer in chronological order and occasionally included a line or two of commentary about those
sites."); Reyhan Harmanci, Time to Get a Life-Pioneer Blogger Justin Hall Bows Out at 31, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 20, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=
/c/a/2005/02/20/MNGBKBEJOOI.DTL (explaining that "pioneer" blog began as online diary in
1994).
25. See Gutman, supra note 24, at 146 n.10, 165 n.127; Konrad Lee, Anti-Employer Blogging:
Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and the Procedure for Allowing Discovery ofa Blogger's
Identity Before Service of Process is Effected, 2006 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, 6; Francine Brevetti,
Software Firm Turns Blogs Into Business Tools, OAKLAND TRIB., Jan. 9, 2003, available at
http://www.nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives;
Paul Lima, Good Riddance To Stuffing
Envelopes, GLOBE &
MAIL (CANADA),
Nov. 27, 2006, at 10, available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061128.tq-lima28/BNStory/
GlobeTQ/home.
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form of news and commentary.2 6 Blogging evolved into podcasting, a
form of audio blogging named after Apple's iPod, and video blogging,
often calling vlogging or vidcasting.27 Sites like YouTube, Google
Video, MySpace Video, blinkx, and VlogMap allow Internet users to
share their opinions, memories, and experiences in audio and video form
with millions of other users.28
The blogosphere, or the universe of all blogs, has been the terrain
for many collisions between intellectual property and the First
Amendment.2 9 Thus, blogging is serving as a test case for the emergence
of new forms of legally-risky digital media distributed over the Internet.
One such form, which could be described as "blogsquatting," involves
writing a parody blog that pretends to be the ruminations of a celebrity or
government official.3 °
The sheer number and obscurity of many blogs means that only
those blogs that discuss prominent public officials, celebrities,
controversial issues, or pop culture conventions get any attention. 31 This
hard fact has contributed to the development of a new and some would
say more insidious form of blogsquatting. At Blogspot.com, an impish
26. See Calloway, supra note 22.
27. See Lima, supra note 25, at 10.
28. The New Networks, WIRED, May 2006, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.05/
networks.html; see also A Guide to the Online Video Explosion, WIRED, May 2006,
Posting of Leander Kahney & Pete
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.05/guide.html;
Mortensen to WIRED BLOG: Cult of Mac, http://blog.wired.com/cultofmac/2005/10/
video-podcastin-l.html (Oct. 21, 2005, 6:40 a.m.); Posting of J.D. Lasica to New Media Musings,
http://www.newmediamusings.com/blog/2006/05/video-sitesthe.html (May 30, 2006, 4:23 p.m.).
29. Steven Levy, Will the Blogs Kill Old Media?, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 2002, at 52.
30. Blogsquatting could also mean annoying everyone by commenting too frequently or at
excessive length in someone else's blog. In its most positive connotation, it is just sitting in on a
blog with the consent of its owner. More ominously, the term has been used to refer to what
unscrupulous website promoters do when they sparn a blog's comments section. See Search.com,
Blogjacking Information, http://www.search.com/reference/Blogjacking (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
31. With about fifty million Internet users who visit blogs, there are about as many blog
readers as bloggers, for an average number of readers per blog that approaches zero. See
COMSCORE, BEHAVIORS OF THE BLOGOSPHERE: UNDERSTANDING THE SCALE, COMPOSITION AND
http://www.comscore.com/blogreport/
2
(2005),
AUDIENCES
WEBLOG
OF
ACTIVITIES
comScoreBlogReport.pdf. Those blogs that reach millions of readers, such as Boing Boing or the
Daily Kos, tend to focus heavily on prominent politicians or brand names. See Marvin Ammori, A
Shadow Government: Private Regulation, Free Speech, and Lessonsfrom the SinclairBlogstorm, 12
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (opining that the Daily Kos, a blog by a young
technology lawyer that focuses on Democratic Party politicians, "was one of the blogosphere's most
highly trafficked and linked sites"); Susan Stellin, Bad News for Old News: And Seven More Things
available at
2006,
Dec.
MAG.,
MEDIA
2007,
in
Forward to
to
Look
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticleHomePage&artaid=51695 (noting that Boing Boing is "a blog about technology and culture that reaches 2 million
readers").
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individual created a parody blog in the name of White House counsel
Harriet Miers, who was nominated to take Sandra Day O'Connor's seat
as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, but
ultimately withdrew. The first posting: "OMG I CAN'T BELIEVE I'M
THE NOMINEE!! !,,32 As might be expected from this curious start, the
blog is a parody of the nominee's sometimes-gushing praise for her boss
(having called him the most "brilliant" man she'd ever met), and of her
alleged judicial inexperience and unpreparedness for a seat on the
Court.33 (One of the last posts was, "Does anyone have any good
recommendations of general books on Constitutional Law, history of the
Supreme Court, etc? THANX! !p.).34
Such flagrant abuses of names and identities on the Internet have
become common. In the 1990s, "cybersquatting" became a major issue,
with Congress and the United States Commerce Department taking
strong steps to ban online appropriation of a company's brand names or
a celebrity's identity.35 Soon the Republican and Democratic National
Committees ("RNC" and "DNC," respectively) demanded protection
against "political cyberpiracy," especially fake candidate and party
websites. Letters from the RNC and DNC to the Department of
Commerce demanded that the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act of 1999 and ICANN mandatory domain name arbitration scheme be
applied to prohibit the use of Internet addresses that include the personal
names of government officials or political candidates in a manner that
may disseminate inaccurate or unreliable information about them.36 The

32. Posting of Harriet Miers to Harriet Miers's Blog!, http://harrietmiers.blogspot.com/
2005/1 0/omg-i-cant-believe-im-nominee.html (Oct. 3, 2005, 11:21 a.m.).
33. Posting of Harriet Miers to Harriet Miers's Blog!, http://harrietmiers.blogspot.com/
2005/10/as-hire-as-and-bush-hired-me.html (Oct. 3, 2005, 1:33 p.m.).
34. Posting of Harriet Miers to Harriet Miers's Blog!, http://harrietmiers.blogspot.com/
2005/10/just-thought-of-something.html (Oct. 5, 2005, 12:28 a.m.).
35. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat.
1501, 1537 (1999) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1125); ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (as adopted on Aug. 26,
1999 and approved by ICANN on Oct. 24, 1999); A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN
and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2003) (describing drafting history of ICANN
cybersquatting arbitration policy, or UDRP).
36. See Letter from Republican National Committee to Department of Commerce (Mar. 30,
2000),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/tmcybpiracy/section2.pdf
(responding to Notice and Request for Public Comments on Dispute Resolution Issues Relating to
Section 3002(b) of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,763); Letter
from Democratic National Committee to Department of Commerce (Apr. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/domainnamerep.html
(responding to Notice and
Request for Public Comments on Dispute Resolution Issues Relating to Section 3002(b) of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,763).
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RNC argued that the First Amendment's protection of political parody is

"not absolute" and "courts have been willing to restrict such rights," so

that a "federal right of publicity on behalf of candidates for public
to "enjoin cybersquatters from further use of a
office" should be used
37
name.,
candidate's

The Bush campaign for the presidency in 2000 was the target of a
site that some have described as a form of cybersquatting, run by Zack

Exley at gwbush.com. 38 Despite a threatening letter from campaign
counsel Benjamin Ginsburg, Mr. Exley kept the site up for years. 39 He
and Mr. Ginsburg sparred online once again during the 2004 election, the
former as Director of Online Communications for the Kerry-Edwards
campaign, and the latter as an advisor to the Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth.a°
Alleged blogsquatters are threatened not simply by trademark and
cybersquatting law, but copyright claims, compulsory ICANN
arbitration, and numerous state law claims arising under right of
publicity statutes and common law causes of action against libel,
appropriation of likenesses, and invasion of privacy.41 Some state courts
37. See Letter from Republican National Committee to Department of Commerce, supra note
36, at 8-11.
38. See Alan Connor, e-Election Column: Week I, BBC NEWS, Apr. 12, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk-politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4435677.stm (describing gwbush.com
as a form of"cybersquatting"); Terry M. Neal, Satirical Web Site Poses Political Test: FacingLegal
Action From Bush, Creator Cites U.S. Tradition of Parody, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1999, at A2
(describing legal wrangling over gwbush.com); Clive Thompson, Anti-Bush Website Shows the
Power of Parody, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 2000, at B15 (describing gwbush.com and its impact on
public discourse surrounding the election); Posting of Chris Camire to New Statesman: New Media
http://www.newstatesman.co.uk/nma/nma2005/dispatches/archive/
Weblog,
2005
Awards
2005/04/18/domain-games/ (Apr. 18, 2005, 1:57 p.m.).
39. See Hannibal Travis, Comment, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian
Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 858 (2000) ("George W. Bush's
campaign sent a cease and desist letter to Zack Exley, the creator of <gwbush.com>,... threatening
legal action for Exley's infringing 'graft' of 'inappropriate' material 'onto the words, look and feel
of the Exploratory Committee's site."') (citations omitted); Chilling Effects Clearinghouse,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?NoticelD=265 (reproducing letter charging Mr. Exley with
copyright infringement, but strangely not with cybersquatting).
40. See Steve Friess, As Candidates Mull '08, Web Sites Are Already Running, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2006, at AI5 (describing gwbush.com as still in operation and selling political bumper
stickers).
41. See id. (explaining that the ICANN arbitration panel ruled that Hillary Clinton "had a
common law right to the trademark of her own name because of her public activities, even though
she had never filed for a trademark. The arbitrator also found that [an Italian] woman had registered
the domain [hillaryclinton.com] in bad faith with the intent to use Mrs. Clinton's fame to direct
traffic to unrelated matters."); see also Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238,
1240-41 (D. Minn. 2005) (describing a request for injunction sought against owner of Web page on
common-law appropriation theory for using a famous blogger's name to criticize his alleged stance
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have also come down squarely on the side of the free speech rights of
bloggers, however. Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the
42
First Amendment protects bloggers' "right to speak anonymously.,
The court ordered the dismissal of a defamation lawsuit brought by a
town councilman who objected to allegations that he suffered from poor
"leadership skills, energy and enthusiasm," as well as "character flaws,"
"an obvious mental deterioration," and paranoia.4 3
Government officials and celebrities may have their best luck
appealing to the providers of bloggers' Web hosting space, or Internet
service, to intervene. 44 For example, Blogspot, now a division of Google,
asserts the right to remove any blogs that "impersonate any person" or
are "abusive, harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous,
invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise
objectionable., 45 As blogsquatting evolves into a ubiquitous
phenomenon, just like spam, spyware, and misleading Web sites, and as
the blogosphere grows in size and influence, demand letters sent to
Internet companies complaining about parody blogs may help define the
outer boundaries of free speech.46 It may fall to Google and the other free
on abortion); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005) (noting that a public official sued
individuals who posted comments to blog pseudonymously for defamation and invasion of privacy);
La Societe Metro Cash v. Time Warner Cable, No. CV030197400S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3302, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (explaining that a litigation was filed over email sent
pseudonymously to plaintiffs' employees charging deceptive financial statements); Gionfriddo v.
Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 310-11 (2001) (describing a lawsuit filed on
common-law appropriation theory challenging use of sports celebrities' names on Internet); Roberts
v. Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, at 1-2 (WIPO Arb. & Med. Ctr., May 29, 2000),
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/word/2000/d2000-02lO.doc (arbitration filed over use of
domain name identical to alleged common law trademark owned by celebrity Julia Roberts);
America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377, 379-80 (Va. 2001)
(noting that a publicly traded company sued five individuals over anonymous Internet postings; the
lawsuit itself was filed anonymously).
42. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454, 457, 468.
43. See id. at 454 (emphasis omitted); see also Doe v. 2themart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d
1088, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("[T]he constitutional rights of Internet users, including the First
Amendment right to speak anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded.").
44. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 938-39 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (explaining
that a provider of communications service may be held liable for trademark infringement based on
its knowledge of subscribers' use of plaintiff's trademark); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
45.
Blogger.com, Terms of Service, http://www.blogger.com/terms.g (last visited June 30,
2007).
46. See Travis, supra note 9, at 37 ("The private censorship enforced by ISPs in the shadow of
vague standards for trademark infringement or dilution can be pervasive. For example, Dow
Chemical was able, merely by complaining of trademark violations to an ISP, to shut down a Web
site critical of Dow's alleged responsibility for a gas leak at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India
that killed thousands of innocent Indian civilians.").
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blog hosts to separate legitimate
"objectionable" impersonation.

parody . from

supposedly

B. A Free Speech Approach to the "Unnatural Expansion" of

Trademark Law
The Supreme Court propelled what many scholars have called the
"unnatural" expansion of trademark rights by cavalierly dismissing a
First Amendment challenge to trademark rights used to censor
expression on matters of public concern.47 More recent cases, however,
have strongly defended Internet users' First Amendment rights to parody
and criticize famous people and corporations. In cases featuring websites
such as nissan.com and falwell.com, courts have found that "commercial
use" of renowned names or trademarks to sell products may be
prohibited, but that the First Amendment shields noncommercial
criticism and parody of politicians and corporations from censorship;
these principles would also protect gwbush.com and the "Miers" blog.4 8
These cases hold that criticism and commentary about a trademark
owner, whether it is a corporation with a registered mark or a politician
claiming common-law trademark or privacy rights, "do not merely

47. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 563-69,
567 n.30 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the law cannot "forbid particular words
without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process," and criticizing majority
for upholding trademark-like rights intrusions against "political advocacy" and other
"noncommercial, nonconfusing, and merely descriptive" uses, and for assuming that access to
alternative methods of communication was adequate recourse for persons censored in their speech
by trademark or similar laws); Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The use
of trademarks has not been protected where it is likely to create confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of the speech or goods in question. ... Just because an opponent of the war in Iraq
might assert an expressive purpose in creating a website with the name lockheedmartincorp.com, for
example, the First Amendment would not grant him the right to use a domain name confusingly
similar to Lockheed's mark.") (citing, inter alia, San FranciscoArts, 483 U.S. at 541); Te-Ta-Ma
Truth Found. v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
First Amendment was no defense to trademark suit by religious group to exclude a racist group from
using the name "Church of the Creator") (citing, inter alia, San FranciscoArts, 483 U.S. 522). The
phrase "unnatural" expansion is a reference to Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of
TrademarkRights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 526 (1995).
48. See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004);
(holding that using a corporation's trademark as an Internet address for a Web page communicating
"disparaging" information about that corporation is protected by First Amendment); Lamparello v.
Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that the First Amendment would be
offended by issuance of trademark or cybersquatting injunction against operator of Web site critical
of famous celebrity and political figure); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900-01
(9th Cir. 2002) (opining that courts should not allow trademark rights to "encroach upon the zone
protected by the First Amendment").
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propose a commercial transaction, so they are non-commercial
speech
49
that are guaranteed full First Amendment protection.,
My view is that while the distinction between commercial speech
and noncommercial speech may help resolve many collisions between
trademark law and the First Amendment, a still more principled
resolution of these disputes is possible. Not all commercial speech may
be prohibited under the First Amendment, so simply because speech is
"commercial" does not resolve the First Amendment problem in such
cases. 50 The view that the First Amendment protects at least some
commercial speech from censorship is consistent with the expectations
of the framers of that amendment, to whom advertising, like ribald and
licentious content, was inseparable from the remainder of the "press.'
The first American newspaper had over half of its columns filled with
advertising. 52 The first newspaper in New York was called the Daily
Advertiser.53 Benjamin Franklin and other Americans had written stirring
defenses of the press, specifically including advertising, because they
believed that "when Men differ in Opinion, both Sides ought equally to

49. Travis, supra note 9, at 42.
50. Compare, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("We are equally clear
that the Constitution imposes no [First Amendment] restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising."), with Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001) ("For
over 25 years, the Court has recognized that commercial speech does not fall outside the purview of
the First Amendment."), Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980) (stating that although "speech proposing a commercial transaction" is "an area traditionally
subject to government regulation," regulation thereof is not always consistent with First
Amendment), and Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976) ("[S]peech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction"' may still be
protected by the First Amendment) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
51. See Brief for American Advertising Federation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 13, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (No. 94-1140), reprinted
in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 278 (Gerald Gunther & Gerhard Casper eds., 1996). Cf United States v. 12
200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 132-33 (1973) (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas argued:
The First Amendment was the product of a robust, not a prudish, age.... In England,
Harris' List of Covent Garden Ladies, a catalog used by prostitutes to advertise their
trade, enjoyed open circulation.... Bibliographies of pornographic literature list
countless erotic works which were published in this time .... It was in this milieu that
Madison admonished against any "distinction between the freedom and licentiousness
of the press.".. . Victorian hypocrisy-the predecessor[] of our present obscenity
laws-had yet to come upon the stage.
Id. (citations omitted).
52. See Brief for American Advertising Federation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 51, at 15.
53. See id.
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have the Advantage of being heard by the Publick," and "'a free press is
the channel of communication to mercantile and public affairs ... ""'
Independence-minded colonists advocated "'the ennobling idea that to
think what they please, and to speak, write and publish their sentiments
with decency and independency 55on every, subject, constitutes the
dignified character of Americans."'

James Madison, known as the "father" and principal framer of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights, 56 counseled on several occasions that
these supreme laws must be construed to protect, at a minimum, what
they were "'understood [to protect] by the nation at the time of [their]
ratification."'' 57 In defending the First Amendment against the assault of
the Sedition Act, Madison wrote that the "arguments now employed in
behalf of the Sedition Act are at variance with the reasoning which then
justified the Constitution, and invited its ratification. 58 The Constitution
as "originally" intended, he added, conferred "no power whatever over
the press," and the First Amendment "was intended as a positive and
absolute reservation of [press freedom]. 59
Madison's view was that the intentions of the framers and ratifiers
of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, even if not publicly expressed,
could be used to interpret and supplement, but not contradict, the
obvious literal meaning of a constitutional provision. 60 For example, in
the national debate about whether Congress had the power to grant
corporate charters, Madison argued that "he well recollected that a power
to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in the
54. See id. at 14, 17 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
56. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); United States v.
Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting); ROBERT A.
GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: How JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO
SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1997); John 0. McGinnis, The Once and FutureProperty-Based Vision
of the FirstAmendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 68 (1996).

57. Brief for American Advertising Federation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note 51, at 13 (quoting Letter from James Madison to John G. Jackson (Dec. 21, 1821),
reprintedin 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 70, 74 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)).
58. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Act (Jan. 17, 1800), in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 608, 648-49 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).

59. Id.at 649.
60.

See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., OriginalIntent in the First Congress, 71 MO. L. REV. 687,

690 (2006).
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may be, are to be admittedwhere doubtful, it is fairly triable by its consequences. [But] [i]n controverted cases, the
meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a

proper guide. Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the
meaning of the parties.
Id. (citation omitted).
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[constitutional] convention and been rejected., 61 The intention of the
drafters was central to the construction of ambiguous or controverted
statutes, treaties,62and ordinary contracts under the rules that prevailed in
Madison's time.

Given Madison's emphasis on interpreting the First Amendment
and the Constitution generally as "understood" at the time of ratification,
what is needed is an inquiry into what the founders could have meant by
stipulating that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press ....

,6

A diligent inquiry into this question

reveals that they likely intended Congress to pass only those laws that
did not "abridge[e]" press freedom any further than the common law of
Britain and the American colonies did in 1791. Madison, for example,
justified the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, notwithstanding its
restrictions on the trade in ideas, on the basis that copyright was
acknowledged at common law in Britain. 64 Jefferson, similarly, who
61. Id. at 711-12 (citation omitted); see also id. at 718-19.
62. See id. at 688 (speaking in Congress, Madison quoted British judge and jurist William
Blackstone as observing "'[t]hat the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the
legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most
probable, and these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effect and
consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law') (citations omitted); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199,
239 (1796) ("The intention of the framers of the treaty, must be collected from a view of the whole
instrument, and from the words made use of by them to express their intention, or from probableor
rational conjectures.") It also appears that in the eighteenth century, contracts between private
parties could be interpreted with the aid of extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent so long as it did
not "controvert[] or var[y]" a written agreement. See Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Legislative
Reform of the Common Law of Contract, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 35, 57-58 (1994). For contract cases
looking to the true intention of the parties to vary or supplement the words, see Bache v. Proctor,
[1780] 99 Eng. Rep. 247, 247 (K.B.); Lessee of Thomson v. White, 1 Dall. 424, 426-27 (Pa. 1789);
Ross v. Norvell, I Va. (I Wash.) 14, 16-18 (1791); accord The Brutus, 4 F. Cas. 490, 494 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1814) (No. 2,060) ("To construe the language [of an agreement] by the technical rules of
literal interpretation would be to defeat the manifest intention of the parties."); WILLIAM W. STORY,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL 149 (photo. reprint 1972) (1844)

("[W]henever such intent [of the parties to a contract] can be distinctly ascertained, it will prevail,
not only in cases where it is not fully and clearly expressed, but also, even where it contradicts the
actual terms of the agreement."); see also Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the
Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1997).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common
law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public
good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals."); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. 591, 602 (1834). The argument for the appellants stated:
Chief Justice Marshall (12 Wheat. 653, 654) lays great stress on the framers of the
constitution having been acquainted with the principles of the common law, and acting
in reference to them. Most of them were able lawyers; and certainly able lawyers drew
up, and revised the instrument.... There is the strongest reason to believe, from the
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pleaded for an explicit Bill of Rights protecting basic freedoms when
other founders such as Alexander Hamilton dismissed the idea, 65
similarly admitted that the common-law offense of libel could continue
to be heard in the courts, which would restrict the right of the press to
publish "false facts" injurious to the lives, property, or reputation of
others. 66 Finally, when Hamilton contended that the Constitution granted
Congress "no power.., by which restrictions [on the liberty of the
press] may be imposed,"
surely he meant none beyond those applicable
67
at common law.
What, then, did the common law provide as to the abridgement of
press freedom by trademark law, currently a threat posed to many Web
sites and blogs? At common law, it was lawful to imitate trademarks
outside of the context of defrauding consumers by using such marks to
sell competing products to the detriment of the trademark owner.6 8
Traditionally, "the law of trade marks and tradenames was an attempt to
protect the consumer against the 'passing off of inferior goods under
language, [that the Copyright Clause] was adopted for the purpose of preserving
[common law copyright], and to reserve from congress any power over it. This
probability arises, almost irresistibly, from the language used; and under the
circumstances that it was used.
Id.
65. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF

THOMAS

JEFFERSON

440

(Julian

P.

Boyd

ed.,

1955),

available at

http://press-

pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1chi4s3O.html ("I do not like... the omission of a bill of
rights providing clearly and.without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the
press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting
force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury .... "); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to President
George Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), in GEORGE TUCKER, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, THIRD
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 390-91 (1837) ("[M]y objection to the constitution was the want

of a bill of rights-Colonel Hamilton's, that it wanted a king and house of lords. The sense of
America has approved my objection, and added the bill of rights, and not the king and lords.").
66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS

JEFFERSON

367

(Julian

P.

Boyd

ed.,

1958),

pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendlspeechsl5.html;

available

at

see also THOMAS

http://pressJEFFERSON,

NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., 1982) (1789), available at http://press-

pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendl-religions40.htm
("The legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my
neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.").
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961),
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_ofrightss7.htm ("[A bill of
rights] would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted .... Why, for instance,
should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by
which restrictions may be imposed?").
68. See Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 140 (1905) ("The
essence of the wrong in unfair competition consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or
vendor for those of another; and if defendant so conducts its business as not to palm off its goods as
those of the [plaintiff], the action fails.").
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misleading labels., 69 Even as to commercial competitors, the common
law recognized no remedy, absent fraud, for using similar signage or
markings to those of a competitor.7 ° Early British and American cases
arising under state law also required a showing of fraud upon consumers
before relief would be granted. 7 1 The first American case granting
injunctive relief based on abuse of a distinctive trademark was not
decided until 1844, and emphasized that the defendant used the mark on
its commercial goods for the "purpose of defrauding the public. 72
Since the adoption of the federal Lanham Act in 1946, trademark
law has proscribed unauthorized uses "in commerce" of federally
registered trademarks that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive .... As has occurred in copyright law, the
Supreme Court has interpreted away many of the limitations of
trademark law to cases of actual consumer deception by identical marks,
in favor of a broader concept of trademark rights as valuable "property"
that arises from "'the expenditure of labor, skill, and money' by an
entity.",74 Congress has accelerated this process by creating a new cause
69. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 814 (1935).
70. See Travis, supra 9, at 6. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Hill, [1742] 26 Eng. Rep. 692, 694
(holding that there was no remedy, absent fraud, against a competitor's use of merely similar stamps
on competing playing cards, any more than there would be to "one innkeeper, setting up the same
sign with another"); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 n.3 (1890) ("As late as 1742, Lord Hardwicke refused to treat a trade-mark as property for
infringement upon which an injunction could be granted."); Mark A. Thurmon, Ending the Seventh
Amendment Confusion: A Critical Analysis of the Right to a Jury Trial in Trademark Cases, II TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 64 (2002) ("Hogg v. Kirby is the earliest reported case in which equity
assumed jurisdiction over a claim of trademark infringement and granted an injunction.... the case
was heard in 1803 ....).
71. See William W. Fisher 111, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the
Ownership of ldeas in the United States, in EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 272 n.33
(1999) (citing Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 214 (1837)); 1 JEROME GILSON,

TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.01 [ 1] (1999) (discussing proof of fraud in Southern v.
How, [1618] 79 Eng. Rep. 1243, and J.G. v. Samford, Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168
(1584)); Thurmon, supra note 70, at 59 n.303, 61 n.315.
72. Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784); New Kids on
the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992). Taylor was the first case granting
relief to an American trademark owner. See Travis, supra note 9, at 6.
73. 15 U.S.C. § I I14(l)(a) (2000). The Lanham Act also protects against imitation of
unregistered marks, unfair competition, false designations of origin, and false advertising. See 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
74. San Francisco Arts & Athl., Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987)
(quoting Int'l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)); See, e.g., Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995) (construing the Lanham Act to allow the
registration of a color as a trademark "where that color has attained 'secondary meaning' and
therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand .. ");Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg.
Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (explaining that a competitor could be restrained
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of action, for trademark "dilution" or interference in a non-competitive
way with the selling power or positive feelings associated with a
trademark, even though the consumer fraud or other harm inflicted by
trademark dilution is nearly impossible to explain, prove, or quantify.75
Other federal courts have, at times, seemingly abandoned any
limiting principle that might constrain the ability of trademark law to
censor cultural and political speech. Several courts have enjoined
noncommercial, nonconfusing Web sites and blogs that reference

from attempt to "poach[] upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol [the plaintiff] has
created"); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1935)
(broadening state law trademark rights by analogy to trespass to real property and because it is
wrong to misappropriate "what equitably belongs to a competitor"); Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at
235, 241-42 (recognizing cause of action under state law in the absence of an "attempt by defendant
to palm off its goods as those of the complainant, characteristic of the most familiar ... cases of
unfair competition ....
" where defendant's conduct amounted "to a false representation to [its
customers] and to their newspaper readers that the news transmitted is the result of defendant's own
investigation in the field," whereas in fact it was plaintiff's "valuable property"); Saxlehner v.
Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19, 33 (1900) (deciding, under state law, that it "is not necessary
to constitute an infringement that every word of a trade-mark should be appropriated" because
actions "have been sustained for the infringement of one of several words of a trade-mark");
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1878) (deciding, under state law, that "exact similarity
[between trademarks] is not required, as that requirement would always enable the wrong-doer to
evade responsibility for his wrongful acts"); see also Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the
Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 898-99 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)).

75. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451, 456 (4th Cir. 1999) (opining that trademark dilution is an "elusive"
concept that plaintiff's purported survey evidence tended to show the "absence of'); Louis Vuitton
Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1510, 1514-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that survey evidence discovered "negligible" dilution of trademark, even
though both parties sold same product, handbags); Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused
About the Trademark Dilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. I 175, 1176-78,

1184, 1186-87 (2006) (pointing out that courts and litigants in leading cases remain unable to
provide useful definitions of trademark dilution, which seems to be a "remedy without a supportable
theorization [or proof] of the harm"); Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational
Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 123 (1993) (dilution is a concept that
lacks "meaningful empirical proof"); Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks
Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to Judge "Likelihood" of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149, 150
(1993) ("[D]ilution has [thus far] been explored almost solely by reference to intuition."). By
contrast, the movement toward reforming torts other than trademark law is denying remedies to
plaintiffs who have suffered grievous and indisputable harms. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (denying remedy to plaintiff seriously injured due to alleged
negligence); id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for "us[ing] federal law as a
means of imposing their own ideas of tort reform on the States"); see generally Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502, 513-14 (1988) (denying remedy to family of individual killed due
to defendants' negligence); id. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for having
"unabashedly ...legislate[d] a rule denying Lt. Boyle's family the compensation that state law
assures them").
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trademarks or celebrity names. 76 Others have adopted the view that

trademark and unfair competition law have "progressed far beyond the
old concept of fraudulent passing off, to encompass any form of
competition or selling which contravenes society's current concepts of
The overbreadth of these rules force even large
'fairness' ... .
corporations to argue for strict limitations on trademarks, as they

76. See, e.g., Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1250 (D. Minn. 2005),
injunction andpartialsummary judgment granted,447 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1017-19 (D. Minn. 2006)
(issuing injunction against Web site on common-law appropriation theory for using a famous
blogger's name to criticize his alleged stance on abortion); Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, No. 02-1782,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17117, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2002), affd, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004)
(enjoining Web site that defendant used to criticize plaintiffs' alleged support of abortion, but only
after being sued); Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, No. 01-CV-72987 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (enjoining Web
site because it used plaintiff's trademark to criticize the plaintiff), rev'd, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir.
2003); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 182-83, 198 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)
(enjoining Web site because it used plaintiff's trademark to criticize plaintiffs practices and act as a
"forum for discussion" by those desiring to "gripe" and exercise their "first amendment rights");
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 918, 921 (E.D.
Va. 2000), ajf'd, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (enjoining Web site precisely because it promoted
organizations and products that were opposed to plaintiffs' views); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993
F. Supp. 282, 308 (D. N.J. 1998), affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (censoring Web site critical of
plaintiffs precisely because it was designed to harm their credibility in the marketplace of ideas);
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1432-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998) (censoring Web site critical
of plaintiffs precisely because it might be effective in achieving site's objective of fostering public
disagreement with plaintiffs' policies and practices); Bellsouth v. Internet Classifieds of Ohio, No.
1:96-CV-0769-CC, 1997 WL 33107251, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 1997) (enjoining Web site
because it used plaintiff's trademark to criticize plaintiff's practices); Sarah Mayhew Schlosser,
Note, The High Price of (Criticizing)Coffee: The ChillingEffect of the Federal TrademarkDilution
Act on CorporateParody, 43 ARIz. L. REv. 931, 931 (2001) (court enjoined Web site that parodied
Starbucks brand because it might dilute the selling power and goodwill of the plaintiff's trademark);
see also Purdy v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 21 Fed. Appx. 518, 520 (8th Cir. 2001); Mayflower
Transit, LLC v. Prince, 314 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. N.J. 2004); Flow Control Indus., Inc. v. AMHI,
Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1195-96, 1200-01 (W.D. Wash. 2003); PGC Prop., LLC v.
Wainscott/Sagaponack Prop. Owners, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); TorontoDominion Bank v. Karpachev, 188 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Mass. 2002); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp.
2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va.
2000); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn. 2000); Koninklijke Philips
Elecs. v. Kang, Case No. D2001-0163 (WIPO Arb. & Med. Ctr., Mar. 27, 2003), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/200l/d2001-0163.html; Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Prade, Case No. D2000-1115 (WIPO Arb.
& Med. Ctr., Oct. 13, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-l1l5.html
(louisvuitton.com); Nortel Networks Ltd. v. Grenier, Claim No. FA0201000104104 (National Arb.
Forum, Mar. 15, 2002), available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/104104.htm;
Vivendi Universal v. Sallen, No. D2001-1121 (WIPO Arb. & Med. Ctr., Nov. 7, 2001), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htmlU2001/d2001-1121 .html (vivendiuniversalsucks.com).
77. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 25:1 (2006)), rev'd
on other grounds, 514 U.S. 159.
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increasingly find themselves on the wrong side of the right to capture the
full economic value associated with a word or phrase.78
Courts should look to the common law of trademarks at the time
that the First Amendment was ratified to rein in these overbroad
assertions of "fairness," which threaten to impede the free flow of
information and ideas via digital media. The courts have heretofore
looked to commercial speech doctrine to resolve disputes between the
exercise of free speech in digital media and the expansive rights of
famous brands. This is inadequate, both because not all commercial
speech may be prohibited, and because the framers would not have
anticipated that trademark dilution or "unfair" competition short of
consumer fraud could have been restrained by federal courts in free
speech cases. Instead, the First Amendment should protect all uses of
and references to trademarks on a matter of public concern that do not
present a serious likelihood of consumer fraud.7 9 Otherwise, the
detachment of trademark doctrines from their roots as an "extension of
common law misrepresentation principles" 80 will unconstitutionally
abridge the freedom of citizens to engage in both political and cultural
speech, which lies at the heart of the First Amendment.
III.
A.

EMBATTLED EBOOKS AND THE ELECTRONIC PRESS

Copyright as DigitalEnclosure: From Limited Monopoly to
Absolute Property

The eBook is a technology for the global distribution of extended
works of fact, fiction, criticism, theology, philosophy, law, and basically

78. Hence, Microsoft was forced into contending that Internet Explorer, the name of its
heavily marketed browser that another firm had a prior claim to, was an unprotectable trademark,
"merely a couple of English words describing a common computer function." Associated Press,
Microsoft Says 'Internet Explorer' a Generic Term, THE DENVER POST, July 1, 1998, at C-02.
Dreamworks SKG, a media company formed by "the three hottest names in Hollywood," was

likewise obliged to argue for "relatively narrow protection" for a trademark. Dreamwerks Prod.
Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1128, 1130 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. Cf Arlen W. Langvardt, supra note 12, at 651-52 (advocating stronger First Amendment

limits to efforts by trademark owners to censor noncommercial and informational speakers); Robert
J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV.
1079, 1079-81 (1986) (opining that when trademark infringement involves "creative form of
expression," it is deserving of First Amendment protection).
80. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 531 (3d ed. 2003).
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any art or science. 8 ' An eBook is defined as ."any full-text electronic
resource"; some would distinguish eBooks from Web content by
defining eBooks as being specially adapted for reading by using
applications other than Web browsers -or in formats other than
hypertext.82 Intended for personal computers and portable digital
assistants, eBooks and eBook software applications are often designed to
improve the aesthetic experience of reading an electronic substitute for
83
paper by imitating paper publishers' fonts and "layout conventions.
Sources of eBooks on the Internet include subscription-based digital
libraries like netLibrary, which provides access to over 100,000
eBooks; 84 self-publishing operations; 85 and p2p networks, because in
excess of "7,300 paper editions of popular books have been scanned and
made available on the internet using [p2p technology such as] Napster
clones.

86

81. See Nancy B. Vermeylen, Book Publishing in the Age of the e-Book, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 190, 193 (2002) (discussing the development of the eBook).
82. See Matthew Gibson & Christine Ruotolo, Beyond the Web: TEl, the DigitalLibrary,and
the Ebook Revolution, 37 COMPUTERS AND THE HUMANITIES 57, 58 (2003).

83. Id.
84. See Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for Copyright
Reform, 33 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 761, 784 (2006); Walt Crawford, Tracking the eBook Players
available
at
2006,
43,
July/Aug.
ECONTENT
29.6
Today. (disContent),
=
=
http://www.econtentmag.com/Articles/ArticleReader.aspx?ArticlelD 16838&ContextSubtypelD 1
1; Lynn Silipigni Connaway, Comment, Librarians, Producers, and Vendors: The netLibrary
Experience, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BICENTENNIAL CONFERENCE ON BIBLIOGRAPHIC CONTROL
FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF NETWORKED RESOURCES AND

THE WEB 429-30 (Ann M. Sandberg-Fox ed., 2001), available at http://www.loc.gov/catdir/
bibcontrol/connaway-paper.html (explaining that services like netLibrary use digital rights
management (DRM) software to restrict users' ability to save, print, modify, and reuse information
contained in eBooks); Press Release, NetLibrary, December eBook of the Month Offers a New
Account of Wagner Based on the Acclaimed New Grove Dictionary of Opera (Nov. 24, 2006),
http://www.netlibrary.com/Librarian/Home/PressReleases/20061201.htm (noting that access to
netLibrary is available to over 14,000 subscribing libraries and their patrons).
85. In addition to the independent publishing of one's own eBook on the Web, as Professors
Benkler and Lessig have done, there are operations like AuthorHouse and Lulu.com that have
helped thousands of authors release eBooks to the public over the Web. See Crawford, supra note
84, at 43; AuthorHouse Book Publishing Co., E-Book Downloading Instructions,
http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/CustomerSupport/ebookhelp.asp (last visited July 14,
2007) (describing how to make an eBook order for any book in AuthorHouse's catalogue);
Lulu.com, E-books, http://www.lulu.com/products/digital/ebook.php (last visited July 17, 2007)
(describing how authors can publish their eBooks over the Web).
86. Mark Hoorebeek, eBooks, Librariesand Peer-to-PeerFile-Sharing,AUSTRALIAN LIB. J.,
May 2003, 163, 163-65 (describing 2001 survey by a British digital rights management firm, and
indicating that parsimonious release of authorized eBooks of bestsellers onto the Internet has
contributed to the scope of the unauthorized previewing of eBooks on p2p networks, just as the
delay and restricted selections of legal music downloads did). An estimated eighty-one such p2p
Napster "clones" were online as of 2003.
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Perhaps the most popular repositories of eBooks to date are those
restricted by copyright law to offering public domain texts. Since being
founded at the University of Illinois in 1971, Project Gutenberg has
posted over 10,000 public domain works, which are downloaded from
the Internet at a rate of about one million eBooks per month; its selection
includes several times as many copies of classical literature and
philosophy as the average small town public library. 87 In addition, the
University of Virginia's Electronic Text Center has, since 2000, made
2,000 free eBooks available to over 8.5 million visitors.88
Although American copyright law began as a strictly limited
statutory monopoly, after that initial generation it began to be
reformulated as a property right with few limits. 89 This process
culminated with the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 90 which a
key supporter described as a prelude toward legislation enacting a

87. See Crawford, supra note 84, at 43.
88. See Travis, supra note 84, at 771 n.70.
89. Compare, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 595-96 (1834) (rejecting theory that
Copyright Act of 1790 merely confirmed perpetual common-law copyright, or that an American
author was "entitled, at common law, to a perpetual property in the copy of his works, and in the
profits of their publication"), Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
13,514) (opining that "the great case of Millar v. Taylor" settled that an author has no "property in
his original conceptions, [or right] that he alone can use them in the composition of a new work, or
clothe them in a different dress by translation . . . , or to make a new work out of his old materials,"
because "neither the common law nor the statute give him such a monopoly, even of his own
creations"), and Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) (holding that copyright is a
limited monopoly consisting in the "sole right of printing, publishing and selling" a book, not an
absolute property right to prevent a new work based on an abridgement, improvement, imitation,
translation, or appropriation of the conceptions thereof), with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557, 559 (1985) (justifying denial of fair use defense to political
magazine that copied very small percentage of plaintiffs' work as necessary to ensure plaintiffs' are
not "deprive[d] ... of their right in the property precisely when they encounter those users who
could afford to pay for it," or of "just compensation for their investment"), Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by
showing how much of his work he did not pirate."), Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) ("The entirety of copyright is the property of the author; and it is no
defense, that another person has appropriated a part, and not the whole, of any property."), and The
Senate Report on the Copyright Act of 1976, Report to Accompany S. 22, Copyright Law Revision
(Nov.
18,
1975),
at
92,
available
at
http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/
copyrights/The%20Senate%20Report%20on%20the%20Copyright%20Act%20of%201976.pdf
(reasoning that the copyright term of "life-plus-50 years is no more than a fair recompense for the
loss of... [an author's] perpetual, unlimited exclusive common law rights in their unpublished
works").
90. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 101, 102, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
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proposal by large corporations for a copyright term that would "last
forever less one day." 9 '
Copyright law as presently construed and applied is pervasively
restricting the public's access to countless works of political argument,
social history, and cultural discourse. 92 This has the effect of suppressing
access to many "interesting, well-researched, provocative stud[ies] of
[public] figure[s] who... wield[] enormous influence over millions of
people," 93 arguably in violation of the First Amendment. In 2002, Project
Gutenberg and the Internet Archive, another major eBook site, joined a
First Amendment suit filed by a smaller site, the Eldritch Press, against
the extension of copyright terms to well over the lifespan of the average
American.94 The eBook providers argued:
In the year 1930, 10,027 books were published in the United States. In
2001, all but 174 of these titles are out of print. While a copy or two
may exist in a library or a used bookstore, the copyright holders cannot
or do not make these titles available to the public. But for the [1998
copyright extension], digital archives could inexpensively make the
other 9,853 books published in 1930 available to the reading public

91. 144 CONG. REC. H9946, H9951-52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary
Bono); see also Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REv. 299, 303 (1998)
(describing 1998 copyright extension as "down payment on perpetual copyright"); Editorial, The
Coming of Copyright Perpetuity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A28 (opining that Supreme Court's
upholding of 1998 copyright term extension may signal "the birth of copyright perpetuity");
Editorial, Copyright Craziness, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2001, at A22 (describing 1998 copyright
extension as ensuring that "[v]ast quantities of creative material [will] be perpetually owned
privately," and as having "shredded any meaningful limit" to copyright terms).
92. See Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging
of Categorizers,60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 137 (2007) ("Claiming absolute rights over the content they
own, many copyright holders appear to demand nothing less than perfect control over any fragment
or sample of their works."); The Coming of CopyrightPerpetuity,supra note 91, at A28 (describing
negative effects of overlong copyrights on production of new works that draw on existing
knowledge); Yochai Benkler, The Free Republic Problem: Markets in Information Goods vs. The
available at
manuscript),
(unpublished
1999)
(Apr.
Ideas
of
Marketplace
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3a2f6be079fd.htm ("[E]nforcing property rights in information
goods requires government to prevent its citizens from using information that they want to use in
ways that they want to use it.").
93. New Era Publ'ns Int'l, APS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1525 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
94. See Brief for Internet Archive et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1-4, Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
clinics/samuelson/papers/briefs/Eldred_Amicus_052002.pdf. The Interet Archive specialized in
digital archives of film and audio content at the time the brief was filed, but had ambitious plans to
arrange for the scanning of up to 50,000 books held by the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in Egypt for
distribution via libraries over the Intemet. See id. at 13 n.21; Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Million Book,
http://www.bibalex.org/isis/ProjectDetails.aspx?Status=ongoing&id=l I (last visited July 17, 2007).
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starting in 2005. Yet because of the [term extension]..., we must
continue to wait, perhaps eternally, while works disappear .... 95

The copyright extension that the eBook providers challenged
operated prospectively for new works and retrospectively for existing
works, despite the impossibility of encouraging, and likelihood of
inhibiting, any further creativity respecting existing works.96
Public domain texts, subscription-based Internet libraries, selfpublishing of eBooks on the Web, and the unauthorized p2p trading of
copyrighted eBooks do not exhaust the universe of eBooks-far from it.
Independent Web publishing of fan fiction is one of the most popular
genres of eBook writing. 97 This is unsurprising in that courts and literary
critics have recognized for generations, if not centuries, that few books
are strictly new and original, and all inevitably borrow heavily from
other books. 98 Shakespeare and Milton, regarded as perhaps the
95. Brief for Internet Archive, supra note 94, at 12-13. Accord Brief for American
Association Law Libraries et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21-22, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/
eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/libraries.pdf (indicating that between 96.5% and 99% of books
published between 1920 and 1950 are still in print). Amici further explained that:
[Few] books published between 1920 and 1950... are now in print. According to Books
In Print, the number of books in print for the past three years exceeds 600,000, while all
titles for the decades of 1920-1950 number less than 6,000. The paucity of republished
works exists despite Congress' extending the terms for such works from 56 to 75 years in
1978.
Id.(footnotes omitted).
96. See Brief for Intemet Archive, supra note 94, at 3; Brief for American Association Law
Libraries, supra note 95, at 3-4.
97. Fan fiction is the crafting of stories about characters or scenarios that already exist in the
popular culture, from Star Trek to Barbie to Dungeons & Dragons. See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal
Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 653,
655 (1997). For descriptions of the popularity and legal troubles of fan fiction, see Christina Z.
Ranon, Note, Honor Among Thieves. Copyright Infringement in Internet Fandom, 8 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 421, 422 (2006); Tushnet, supra, at 652-60, 668, 672-74; Amy Harmon, 'Star Wars'
Fan Films Come Tumbling Back to Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at 28; Allan Hoffman, Fan
Fiction Is Running Wild on the Web, STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 11, 2004, at 8.
98. See, e.g., Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[I]n Hollywood, as in
the life of men generally, there is only rarely anything new under the sun."); Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) ("With so many sources before them
[authors] might quite honestly forget what they took; nobody knows the origin of his
inventions .. "); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 618-19 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) ("In
truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an
abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout .... If no book could be the subject of copyright which was not new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be no
ground for any copy-right in modem times."); ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE-Music-TEXT 146
(1977) (defining a book as "a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them
original, blend and clash .... a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of
culture"); JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE
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"brightest originals" of English literature, had arguably borrowed even
more extensively from others, copying not just characters but entire
plots.

99

Efforts to create new works out of old ones, the traditional manner
in which creativity operates, have sparked an outpouring of novel-length
eBooks on the Internet, such as Dynasty, a reimagining of Star Wars
with Luke Skywalker falling captive in the Death Star and being trained
as a Sith Lord on Coruscant.'00 Supreme Court precedent restricting fair
use and the ability of authors to mimic one another's' creations has
hobbled Internet users' ability to distribute such works, however. Most
notably, the Court has forced authors quoting, imitating, criticizing, or
parodying existing work to somehow prove a negative that takes into
account not only their own work but all similar works that might be
released in the future, so that to defeat fair use a corporation "need only
show that if the challenged use 'should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work."" ' So
GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 247 (Third London ed. 1851) ("[l]f there be any thing in the world
common to all mankind, science and literature are in their nature publicijuris[of public right], and
they ought to be as free and general as air or water. They forget their Creator, as well as their fellowcreatures, who wish to monopolize his noblest gifts and greatest benefits. Why did we enter into
society at all, but to enlighten one another's minds, and improve our faculties, for the common
welfare of the species?"); TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 138 (1983)
("There is no such thing as literary 'originality', no such thing as the 'first' literary work: all
literature is 'intertextual."'); James Boyle, Op-Ed., Sold Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at 15
("'Poetry can only be made out of other poems; novels out of other novels,' as the critic Northrop
Frye famously put it."); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Benefits: The Norms of
Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1030 (1990) (noting
that Yale literary critic "Harold Bloom... suggests that all art is a creative misreading of one's
predecessors, a Freudian rebellion against what came before; seen this way, all works are potentially
derivative .... '[A]II poems can be read as rewritings of other poems ... ') (footnotes omitted).
Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law DiscouragesCreative Output: The Overlooked Impact
of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 815 (2004) ("Even leading copyright advocate Mark
Twain acknowledged that 'we are all thieves."').
99. See Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619 (explaining that these authors "gathered much from the
abundant stores of current knowledge and classical studies in their days"); JAMES PRENDEVILLE,
MILTON'S PARADISE LOST, AND A MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF MILTON 362, 400, 412 (1841)
(mentioning that Milton copied plot of ParadiseLost from the Bible); Nadel, supra note 98, at 815
(revealing that "many of Shakespeare's plots were originated by others").
100.

See VALERIE VANCOTTI & REBECCA THOMPSON,

DYNASTY

(2005), available at

http://www.geocities.com/valeriev84/dynasty.html. The author has apparently published a dozen or
more stories based on the Star Wars characters in several "fanzines." See Valerie Vancotti, Dark vs.
Light: Fan Fiction, http://www.geocities.com/valeriev84/fanfiction.html (last visited July 18, 2007).
101. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (quoting Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 429, 451, 484, 484 n.36 (1984)); see also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (remanding case involving parody of
a prominent copyrighted work for determination in courts below as to whether parodist could prove
an absence of harm to the plaintiff's potential market for licensing similar parodies: "Since fair use
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applied, copyrights threaten greatly to impede forms of digital media that
imitate existing works of authorship in order to articulate the dreams,
political ideals, cultural commitments,
and social identities of these
02
works' observers, fans, or critics.1
Last but not least, Google is rolling out a system for the rapid
search and retrieval of relevant passages from millions of books
contained in university and city library systems. 10 3 Google is scanning
the full contents of both copyrighted and public domain books contained
in the University of Michigan and the University of California library
systems, as well as antique and public domain works from Oxford,
Harvard, Stanford, and the New York Public Library.10 4 For copyrighted
books, Google will only provide short previews of a few lines each,
which its automated system prepares. Google has given this "snippet"
treatment not only to copyrighted books, but also to works that should be
in the public domain because they were authored by the United States
government, such as the report of the hearings on the Pearl Harbor attack
05
that prompted the United States to declare war on Japan.'
Now, Google is facing a joint action by several publishers and a
putative class action of tens of thousands of authors challenging the
scanning and previewing of their works by Google as a copyright
infringement. 10 6 Google acknowledges that it digitally scans copyrighted
books from participating libraries and "makes available to the libraries
one scan of the books for their use in compliance with copyright law,"

is an affirmative defense, its proponent would... [need to offer] favorable evidence about relevant
markets.") (footnote omitted).
102. See COOMBE, supra note 1,at 30-31, 55, 88-129; Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural
Legal Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463, 470 (1998); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property
and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV.

1853, 1855 (1991); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 123, 136-37 (1996); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the

Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1729-30 (1999); Sunder, supra note 1, at 307; Rebecca
Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying

Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 580-81 & n.208 (2004); Tushnet, supranote 97, at 656.
103.

See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyright Jungle, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 2006,

at 42, available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/2006/5/Vaidhyanathan.asp.
104. See id. at 42-43, 47-48.
105. See Google
Inc., Google
Book Search, http://books.google.com/books?vid=
OCLC61120486&id=vNk9ZH7A9ewC&dq=intitle:pearl+date: 1945-l955&q=intitle:pearl%20
date:1945-1955&pgis=l (last visited July 18, 2007). The report of these hearings was a public
document and therefore uncopyrightable even prior to the enactment of section 105 of the Copyright
Act of 1976. See Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 F. 373, 374 (2d Cir. 1920).
106. See Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster
for Books?, 33 MIAMI L. REV. 601, 626, 627 (2006).
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but maintains that the First Amendment bars plaintiffs from obtaining an
07
injunction or damages against it under copyright law.
B. A Free Speech Approach to the Impending "CopyrightCage"
As it did in trademark law, the Supreme Court has developed
several wholly unsatisfactory doctrines to explain away, defer, and
disregard the conflict between copyright and the First Amendment. In
assessing digital libraries' First Amendment challenge to legislation
frustrating the public's access to eBook versions of historical and
political books from the middle of the last century, the Supreme Court
held that when Congress retrospectively extends copyright terms to
"protect[] authors' original expression from unrestricted exploitation," it
"does not raise the free speech concerns present when the government
or ideas."108
compels or burdens the communication of particular facts
First Amendment rights are adequately preserved, in the Court's view, so
long as Congress leaves available some means of expressing the same
idea using different words or expression.'°9
The Court's ruling in Eldred represented the culmination of an
unfortunate series of decisions establishing a "definitional balance" of
copyright claims against First Amendment interests, under which
Congress has nearly unlimited discretion "to determine the intellectual
property regimes that, overall, in that body's judgment, will serve the
ends of the [Copyright] Clause."' 0 The Court also reiterated its
107. See Answer, Jury Demand, and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Google, Inc. at 5,
McGraw-Hill v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005), available at
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic87591 .files/McGraw-Hill-v._Google-Answer.pdf
(describing "Google Library Project" starting in December 2004, which "will make available for
searching online an index of words found in many books in several of the world's leading
libraries"); id. at 8 (listing defendant's third affirmative defense as: "Plaintiffs' claims and/or the
remedies sought are barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."); see also
Answer, Jury Demand, and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Google, Inc. at 6, Author's Guild v.
available at
2005),
30,
Nov.
(S.D.N.Y.
05-CV-8136
No.
Inc.,
Google
http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006spring/law/357c/001/projects/Jsieman/AGanswer.pdf.
108. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
109. See id. at 219 (stating that the fact that "idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work" is
not protected by copyright means that the Copyright Act "'strikes a definitional balance... by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression"') (quoting
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
110. Id. at 222. For earlier decisions in this tradition, see San Francisco Arts & Athl, Inc. v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) ("Congress reasonably could conclude
that.., unauthorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the [trademark owner] by
lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the marks."); Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 569 (rejecting First Amendment limits on copyright because "Congress has not
designed... a 'compulsory license' permitting unfettered access to the unpublished copyrighted
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rudimentary Chicago School economics"' of the First Amendment,
whereby there would be no "economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas" without terms extending past the life span of the
average American and achieved by retrospective term extensions.1 2 The
expression of public figures"); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)
(explaining that although Congress may not remove existing knowledge from the public domain by
granting patents on existing technology, it may otherwise "implement the stated purpose of the
Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim");
McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206, 211 (1843) (holding that the Copyright and Patent Clause
grants plenary power to Congress to extend the terms of an existing patent).
111. The "Chicago School" tradition of law and economics too often proceeds by ignoring the
insights of structuralist economists and the "Silicon Valley school" of economics that anticompetitive predation by monopolists and oligopolists against smaller competitors is a reality, and
that "unrestricted trade between and among competitors or buyers and sellers-is the optimal way to
maximize consumer welfare." Eliot G. Disner, Antitrust Law: The Chicago School Meets the Real
World, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 14-15, 17; see also JONATHAN L.RUBIN, AM.ANTITRUST INST.,
RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL
FOR COMPETITION DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO

EXCLUSIONARY
ABUSES
8
(Mar.
31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/491.pdf
(arguing
that
a
"Chicago
school
perspective... assumes away most of the elements of the [monopolization] dynamic" by assuming
"that buyers are free to choose to deal with whomever they wish or that rivals are already present or
poised to enter"); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 301, 304-05 (2002) (arguing that the
Chicago School "economics of the brick-and-mortar world" ignores the actual economics and
market structure of "digital content distribution" because the "structure and economics of
cyberspace promise to end the free rider problem and the market failure associated with distributing
content using the technologies of Gutenberg and the industrial revolution").
112. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. The Eldred court reasoned:
Calibrating rational economic incentives ... is a task primarily for Congress, not the
courts. Congress heard testimony from a number of prominent artists; each expressed the
belief that the copyright system's assurance of fair compensation for themselves and
their heirs was an incentive to create.
Id. at 207 n.15. For critiques of this conclusory account of economic incentives, see id. at 254-55
(Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer opined:
No potential author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing
a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the copyright extension to
matter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2% of all copyrights retain commercial
value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more (a typical pre-extension copyright
term)-must be far smaller.... And any remaining monetary incentive is diminished
dramatically by the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more
into the future, when, not the author, but distant heirs, or shareholders in a successor
corporation, will receive them. Using assumptions about the time value of money
provided us by a group of economists (including five Nobel prize winners),... it seems
fair to say that, for example, a 1% likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years,
starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents today. ...
What potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a
sum? What monetarily motivated Melville would not realize that he could do better for
his grandchildren by putting a few dollars into an interest-bearing bank account?
Id.; see also THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, 8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 198-202
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Court based these conclusions primarily upon a previous decision
opining that no writers will produce anything "worth reading" if
traditional fair use rights survived. 113 The previous decision, Harper &
Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, declared that the "'social value
[of dissemination]"' of information should be disregarded in copyright
cases even when it "'outweighs any detriment to the artist,"' because
courts should only "depriv[e] copyright owners of their right in the
property" where no "fully functioning market" exists to "encourage[] the
creation and dissemination of [the views] of public figures."'1 14 Unlike
more sophisticated accounts, the economic analyses of the Supreme
Court in these cases did not reckon with the potential costs and
unintended consequences of extended copyright duration and scope
work, reducing
(such costs include raising the cost of inputs for creative
15
overall output, imposing administrative costs, etc.).'
The Court's resolution of the First Amendment issue in Eldred is
problematic for several reasons. First, its alleged "definitional balance"
must have some limit, or it would be a categorical copyright exception to
the First Amendment, rather than a "balance." ' 16 To hold that the fair use

(Trevelyan ed., 1879) (extending copyright terms past life of the author imposes a quantifiable "tax
on readers" that cannot be justified by a speculative "bounty to writers" that "is to be enjoyed more
than halfa century after [they] are dead ... perhaps by somebody unborn").
113. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
114. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559-68, 66 n.9 (collecting authorities on economic analysis of
fair use).
115. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 318-19 (1970); William W. Fisher
Ill, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1668-72 (1988); Robert M.
Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationaleof Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 43031 (1966); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm,49 VAND.
L. REV. 483, 655 (1996); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, I ECONOMICA
167, 167-71 (1934).
116. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 16, at 182-83 ("Free speech guarantees can't be
avoided simply by characterizing a speech restriction as an 'intellectual property law.' After all, one
could plausibly view libel law as protecting a person's property interest in his reputation, or a
company's property interest in its product's reputation-some courts have indeed done so.")
(footnotes omitted); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and
Opportunities,66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 147, 169-70 (2003) (criticizing courts for behaving as if
there is an "intellectual property exception to the First Amendment" that does not exist); Reply Brief
of Appellant, Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 99-5430), reprinted in The
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 651, 670 (2000) ("[T]he statute that grants the copyright obviously remains subject to ordinary
First Amendment analysis. As we pointed out before, a statute that granted copyrights to 'decent'
works only, cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997),... would... raise a First Amendment issue
that was not exhausted by the claim that the copyright protected expression only."). As Lemley &
Volokh explain:
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doctrine as presently construed represents the outer boundary of the First
Amendment right to comment on or transform existing speech is to
constrain and abandon the expansive right7 of free speech that existed in
1791 with respect to copyrighted works.'"
Second, the ability to express the same ideas is an insufficient
"balance," because as described below, copyright law at the time of the
founding allowed speakers and writers to use the expression of others,
and not simply their ideas, in new works. The Supreme Court has
similarly concluded that it is insufficient under the First Amendment to
permit a newspaper to express its contributors' ideas without libeling a
public official,' 18 or a protester or picketer to protest somewhere else
than on private property or in public buildings, 119 or an antiwar activist
to express his views without using profanity or anti-draft rhetoric,120 or a
newspaper to describe the world or reveal government deception without
publishing stolen government documents or endangering national
security. 121

The Copyright and Patent Clause grants power to Congress, but the point of the Bill of
Rights is to restrain the federal government in the exercise of its enumerated powers. In
exercising its other powers, Congress is subject to First Amendment constraints: For
instance, the government has the enumerated power to run the post office, but this
doesn't mean it can refuse to carry communist propaganda ....
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 16, at 190.
117. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (describing expansive right of using
excerpts from old books in new ones that existed in eighteenth century).
118. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-50 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83
(1964) (rejecting argument that newspaper could be held liable for publishing false facts without
adverse effect on expression of political ideas); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 25457 (1952) (declaring that "libelous" and "insulting" words "are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
119. See Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
319-20, 323 (1968) (rejecting argument that picketing elsewhere than on private property was
adequate alternative under First Amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946)
(holding that states could not, consistent with the First Amendment, allow a corporation to utilize its
property rights to "restrict [citizens'] fundamental liberties").
120. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15-16, 26 (1971) (rejecting idea that censoring
words "Fuck the Draft" on a t-shirt could occur without a risk of suppressing the expression of an
antiwar message).
121. See United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(discussing various allegations by United States that New York Times acquired and threatened to
publish classified study on Vietnam War in violation of Espionage Act and other laws), rev'd, 444
F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (remanding for potential issuance of preliminary injunction), rev'd, New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (holding that a preliminary
injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech).
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Third, overbroad copyrights are objectionable for precisely the
same reasons that other overbroad regulations of speech for wellmeaning purposes can be: they chill "'debate[s] on public issues [that]
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."", 122 Moreover, such
copyrights unnecessarily restrict distribution of works that shed light on
controversial public issues. 123
Fourth, copyright laws represent content-based regulations favoring
some forms of expression and disfavoring others (unauthorized sequels,
124
parodies, or extensive criticisms or commentaries on others' works).
Copyright law is a system of regulation that restricts the speaking or

122. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan,
J.,dissenting) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270); see also id. at 582, 605 (stating that each
"important extension of property rights" amounts to "a corresponding curtailment in the free use of
knowledge and of ideas," and to an interference with the "broad dissemination of principles, ideas,
and factual information [that] is crucial to the robust public debate and informed citizenry that are
'the essence of self-government."') (citation omitted).
123. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 249 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Tihe likely amounts of extra royalty payments are large enough to suggest that
unnecessarily high prices will unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic works (or lead
to disobedience of the law)-not just in theory but in practice ....[N]ew, cheaper
editions can be expected when works come out of copyright".... One year after [the]
expiration of copyright on Willa Cather's My Antonia, seven new editions appeared at
prices ranging from $2 to $24 ....

Id.; see also Rosemont Enters. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding
that copyright law "must be tempered by a countervailing privilege that the public have [in
obtaining] some information concerning important public figures"); id. at 311 (Lumbard, C.J.,
concurring) ("The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the copyright laws at least to the extent
that the courts should not tolerate [the use of the copyright statute as an] attempted interference with
the public's right to be informed regarding matters of general interest ....); Shaffer Van
Houweling, supranote 4passim; Nadel, supra note 98, at 789.
124. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) ("[L]aws that by their
terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content based."); id. at 677-78 (O'Connor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., Scalia, J., and
Thomas, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The First Amendment does more than just
bar government from intentionally suppressing speech of which it disapproves. It also generally
prohibits the government from excepting certain kinds of speech from regulation because it thinks
the speech is especially valuable."); San Francisco Arts & Athl., Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 561 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (opining that exclusive right in a word "restricts
speech in a way that is not content neutral"); Baker, supra note 12, at 923 (arguing that copyright
law is "facially based on content" because its "'application of which turns on the content of the
speech,"' and "'enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message')
concurring in the judgment), and
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)); id. (arguing that copyright also has a
"content-based purpose," namely the assumption "that society is left with less valuable media
content without the law"); id. at 930 (maintaining that copyright is content-based because it
"'describe[s] permissible [speech] in terms of its subject matter') (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 16, at 186 ("Copyright liability
turns on the content of what is published.").

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/17

36

Travis: Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a Fir
2007]

OF BLOGS, EBOOKS, AND BROADBAND

writing of "already-said" speech, or "speech that relies on another's
25
labor," based explicitly and in detail upon the content of such speech.
Finally, copyright unconstitutionally prohibits some citizens from
exercising their liberties of speech and the press to express themselves.
The authors of fan fiction, for example, have a First Amendment interest
in telling new stories that comment on or criticize other authors' wellknown stories or characters. 126 Google's project directors, likewise, have
125. See Baker, supra note 12, at 906 (stating that copyright laws are "content-based
limitations on speech" because they impose "legal restriction[s] that [that] directly and specifically
aim[] at controlling speech," specifically "already-said speech"); Zimmerman, Information as
Speech, supra note 12, at 731 (copyright law restricts "right to engage in speech that relies on
another's labor" without "obtaining a license" that may "be withheld at will," and therefore
subordinates free speech "to permission and to the pocketbook as preconditions of a speaker's
exercise of her own expressive capacity"). From the speaker's perspective, copyright is contentbased because copyright liability is determined by reference to the content of a work, see Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 16, at 186, and because a speaker must "refrain from making fair uses of
[specific] content out of fear of litigation." Nadel, supra note 98, at 806 n.88 (emphasis added)
(citing LESsiG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 2, at 95-99, 184-88, 304-06). A speaker may even be
held liable under copyright law precisely for her "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement." See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005); see
also id. at 2774 (finding liability based on "express promotion [and] marketing" of defendant's
software).
126. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11 th Cir. 2001)
substituted opinion at 268 F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that First Amendment
rights of an author to use existing characters to express new message would be violated by
injunction based on copyright in the characters); LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 2, at
187-90, 196-99 (stating that overbroad copyrights, and extensions of term of existing copyrights,
suppress free speech in violation of First Amendment); Abrams, supra note 12, at 11 (reasoning that
First Amendment may be offended by injunctions in copyright cases); Baker, supra note 12, at 893,
900, 908 (explaining that First Amendment should condemn as unconstitutional any effort by "one
private party tolimit another's speech"); Cohen, supra note 12, at 1018-19 (opining that copyright
owners' efforts to monitor readers of their work and prevent them from copying or printing it out for
incorporation into new works are objectionable from the standpoint of First Amendment); Koenig,
supra note 12, at 837-38 (arguing that overbroad trademark rights threaten free speech); Lange,
supra note 12, at 133-34 (urging a revival of First Amendment's role in curtailing ability of
intellectual property laws to censor creativity); Yen, supra note 12, at 432-33 (maintaining that First
Amendment values have vital role to play in preserving "basic rights of expression" against chilling
effect of overbroad copyrights); Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 12, at 681 (noting
that the expansion of intellectual property doctrines has threatened First Amendment values by
encroaching upon public domain or linguistic "common"); Zimmerman, Is There a Right, supra note
12, at 348-349 (reasoning that judges should use First Amendment to prevent copyrights from
censoring thought and communication among citizens and friends). Cf Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 579-82 (1977) (Powell, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (declaring that First Amendment should protect news broadcasts from certain state law
intellectual property claims); Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing use of intellectual property laws to "snuff out creativity" in
form of"literary work," which is "worthy of the highest First Amendment protection from intrusive
state laws .... "); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (overprotecting intellectual property amounts to unconstitutional
interference with freedom of speech); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st
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a free speech interest in expressing the idea of universal access to human
knowledge by providing a system for12searching through our written
tradition for important facts or opinions. 1
Eldred and other First Amendment skeptics also argue that the same
Constitution that contains the First Amendment also embraces copyright
law, and consequently that copyright should be immune from external
First Amendment limitations. 128 This reverses the order of analysis, for
an amendment modifies and limits the underlying power, not vice
versa.1 29 Madison intended the "freedom of the press" under the First
Amendment to be at least as unrestrained as the press in the American
colonies, "which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common
law," but extended to "unrestrained animadversions" on the character
and conduct of public officials. 130 He affirmed that the First Amendment
would not leave the press to the whim of Congress:

Cir. 1987) (holding that the First Amendment forbids use of trademarks to "quash an unauthorized
use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view") (citation
omitted).
127. Cf Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 636 ("Through 'original programming or by exercising
editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire,' cable programmers
and operators 'see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of
formats."') (emphasis added) (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986)).
128. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 ("The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted
close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies
are compatible with free speech principles."); Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1263 n.12 ("While the First
Amendment disallows laws that abridge the freedom of speech, the Copyright Clause calls
specifically for such a law."); cf 4-19E NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.03[B] (2007) (opposing
"evaluating copyright injunctions directly under the Constitution" because, among other reasons,
first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790, while "the First Amendment... became effective in
1791").
129. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that
legislation otherwise within the constitutional power of the legislator may fall "within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments"); see also Amar, The
Supreme Court, supra note 17, at 29-30 ("Indeed, because the People have chosen to affix
amendments to the end of the document rather than directly rewrite old clauses, a reader can never
simply look to an old clause and be done with it. Rather, she must always scour later amendments to
see if they explicitly or implicitly modify the clause at hand."); Delgado, supra note 17, at 129 n.192
("In cases of direct conflict, the first amendment, coming later as it did, should supervene any clause
in that original [Constitution]."); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on
First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REv. 421, 426 (2006) ("First Amendment doctrine is the
product of constitutionalized ... common law judicial lawmaking that trumps popular legislative
enactments."); cf Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (noting that "Article
I cannot be used to circumvent" an amendment to the Constitution, "[e]ven when the Constitution
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area").
130. Madison, supra note 58, at 647 (emphasis added).
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The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to
write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as
one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable....

The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is
131
expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government ....
Madison stated clearly that "the freedom of the press" means the right to

be "exempt... not only from previous restraint of the executive, as in
restraint also; [and] ...from the
Great Britain, but from legislative
32
laws."'1
of
penalty
subsequent

131. James Madison, House Debate, June 8, 1789, in I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 440, 451
(1794), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendl-speechsl4.html
(emphasis added). He also stated that: "'In every state, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted
a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every description, which has not
been confined to the strict limits of the common law. On this footing the freedom of the press has
stood; on this foundation it yet stands ... ' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275
(1964) (quoting JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 570 (1799-1800) (Burt Franklin ed., 1888), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field
(DOCID+@lit(ed00499))).
132. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 131, at 569-70. Thus, the "standard of [press] freedom in the United
States" was intended to go at least as far as the common law's protection of the press, as
supplemented by the actual practice of press freedom in Britain, where "public opinion" and fear of
"impeachment" persuaded legislators to give much more leeway. Id. at 570. Jefferson also rejected
the notion that freedom of the press meant simply the absence of pre-publication censorship.
Madison and Jefferson roundly condemned the Sedition Act of 1798, even though it was a
subsequent punishment arguably within the enumerated powers of Congress over national security,
and even though it still contained protections from truthful or unintentionally false speech or
publications from subsequent punishment. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
xi, 13, 128-29, 201-03, 297, 303 (1985). Leonard Levy famously argued that Madison and Jefferson
endorsed the Blackstonian definition of "freedom of the press" as a freedom against prior restraint,
not subsequent punishment. See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY ix-xii (1964); Leonard Levy, Liberty and the

FirstAmendment: 1790-1800, 68 AM. HIST. REV. 22, 25-27, 36-37 (1962). This account, however,
cannot explain Madison's express references to "subsequent penalty" as prohibited by the First
Amendment, or to the legislative discretion of the British Parliament to regulate post-publication
speech as being inconsistent with popular sovereignty in the United States, or to the importance of
"unrestrained' speech that is "beyond the reach of government." James Madison, House Debate,
June 8, 1789, in I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 440, 451 (1794), available at http:/presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendl-speechsl4.html. Levy's account is also internally
inconsistent in that he concedes that the Framers intended that Congress be prohibited from making
any law establishing penalties for speech after it has been published, but in doing so Congress used
the very phrase "freedom of the press" that he claims means only freedom from prior restraint of the
press. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 501-06
(1983).
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The nature of an experiment in self-government prompted broader
formulations of freedom of the press than had prevailed in England,
where, from Milton to Blackstone, it was construed to prohibit only
licensing, and to permit all manner of civil and criminal liability
allowable at common law.' 33 Madison noted with concern "the parochial,
self-interested popular majorities whom [legislators] represented."' 134 His
"premise" was that "absolute sovereignty" resided in the people to
135
change their legislators, not in the legislators to change the people.
Popular sovereignty required an even greater, not lesser, "degree of
freedom in the use of the press" than in England. 136 Similarly, Jefferson
favored a near-absolute prohibition on Congress regulating speech and
the press.137 He advocated to Madison that the Bill of Rights be amended
to include a provision that: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged
of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish anything but false
facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property or reputation of
1 38
others, or affecting the peace of the confederacy with foreign nations.'
Thus, Jefferson "den[ied] the power of Congress 'to controul the
freedom of the press."",139 For these reasons, one of the earliest
133. See In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 839-41 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126). The court explained:
What might be deemed the freedom of the press, if it had been a new subject, and never
before in discussion, might indeed admit of some controversy .... We derive our
principles of law originally from England.... The definition of it is, in my opinion, no
where more happily or justly expressed than by the great author of the commentaries on
the laws of England, ...[whose] views of the subject could scarcely be unknown to
those who framed the amendments to the constitution ....His explanation is as follows:
'The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state. And this consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the
press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the
consequence of his own temerity.
Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (176569)).
134.

JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 108 (1998).

135. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274.
136. Id. at 275-76 (quoting 4 ELLIOT, supra note 131, at 570).
137. See 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 464-65 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904)
("[L]ibels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the
cognizance of federal tribunals"), quoted in Alan J. Koshner, The Founding Fathers and Political
Speech: The First Amendment, the Press and the Sedition Act of 1798, 6 ST. LOuIS U. PUB. L. REv.
395, 398 n.13 (1987).
138. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (1789), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 450 (Library ed. 1903).
139. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams
(1804), quoted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 522-23 n.4 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)). Thus, both Jefferson and Madison opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, 1
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authoritative treatises on the Constitution and American law concluded
that the First Amendment conferred an "unlimited right to [comment on
public issues], either by speaking, writing, printing, or by any other
mode of publishing," and that "the smallest infringement of the rights
guaranteed by40this article, must threaten the total subversion of the
government."1
Fortunately, the Eldred opinion itself left open a path toward a more
principled and defensible First Amendment analysis. The Court held
that: "the standard for First Amendment review that should apply in the
context of copyright statutes" is that "laws that do not change the
'traditional contours' of copyright protection are not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny, leaving the implication that laws that change those

Stat. 566, 570, 596, which prohibited intentionally making false statements as part of a combination
to impede execution of U.S. law. See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274 ("The [Sedition] Act allowed
the defendant the defense of truth, and provided that the jury were to be judges both of the law and
the facts. Despite these qualifications, the Act was vigorously condemned as unconstitutional in an
attack joined in by Jefferson and Madison."). Madison led an effort in the Virginia legislature to
condemn the Sedition Act as claiming "'a power... expressly and positively forbidden by [the First
Amendment]-a power which, more than any other, ought to produce universal alarm, because it is
levelled against the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual
guardian of every other right."' Id. at 274 (quoting 4 ELLIOT, supra note 131, at 553-54). "Jefferson,
as President, pardoned those who had been convicted and sentenced under the Act and remitted their
Id.; see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 156-57
fines .. I."
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that Jefferson believed Sedition Act to be "plainly
unconstitutional"). Although Jefferson goes on in the passage from his Letter to Abigail Adams
quoted in Sullivan to concede the right of states to "controul" the press as at common law, it is not
clear to what extent Madison agreed with that interpretation. As one scholar puts it, Congress "was
the Framers' primary target" but not necessarily "their sole target." Anderson, supra note 132, at
502. Most courts and commentators have agreed that the First Amendment was also "intended to
limit the federal executive and judiciary," even though the purposeful use of the word "Congress" in
the First Amendment and by Jefferson would permit federal executive censorship as much as
censorship based on state laws. Id.; See. e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
718-19 (1971). In any event, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation of
First Amendment rights as fundamental fights protected against intrusion by the states extended the
freedom of speech and the press before Congress to the states. Cf Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721-22 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
decision by this Court that the First Amendment was 'incorporated' into the Fourteenth Amendment
and thereby made applicable against the States, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69
(1931); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940),... greatly expanded the number of
statutes which would be subject to challenge under the First Amendment.").
140.

ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 297 (1803) (emphasis added).

See also Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 12, at 680-81 ("'[C]onstitutional liberty of
speech and of the press... implies a fight to freely utter and publish whatever the citizen may
please."') (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 422 (Da
Capo Press ed. 1972) (1868)).
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'traditional contours' do get First Amendment scrutiny."' 14' This is
probably insufficient to fully vindicate the First Amendment, being that
the contours of a later-adopted amendment should modify the earlieradopted delegation of constitutional power, but it is a place to start. 42
What, then, are the "traditional contours" of copyright? This returns
us to my argument regarding the original intent of the First Amendment.
Its framers were accustomed to a very focused, speech-protective form
of copyright. They would be dismayed to witness the extent to which
intellectual property law is currently being deployed as a tactic to censor
historical treatises, legal tracts, novels, documentary films, television
news, and other works. James Madison and the other framers of the Bill
of Rights could never have anticipated that an article in a political
magazine about a former President (and potential candidate for another
term as President) would be censored because it quoted an
"infinitesimal" proportion of that former President's memoirs, thereby
allowing "the statutory monopoly [of copyright to] choke off
multifarious indirect uses and consequent broad dissemination of
information and ideas."' 143 Nor could they have imagined a pervasive
"clearance culture" that demands detailed licensing and pre-publication
censorship of political news
and opinion for compliance with
144
rules.
copyright
unforgiving
The founding generation rarely, if ever, countenanced an injunction
against a political book on copyright grounds. 45 In the Federalist
Papers, Madison anticipated only that the "traditional view" of copyright
law contained in the case of Millar v. Taylor and other British "common
141. Lawrence Lessig, CreativeEconomies, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 33, 41.
142. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
143. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 590, 598 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZt, supranote 6, at 22-24.
145. See Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862, 867, 872 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 17,486)
(injunction denied), rev'd on other grounds, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999,
1001 n.2 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872) (injunction denied); Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 76567 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,580) (preliminary injunction denied, but injunction granted after trial
against a map/chart of the North American coast); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 16, at 154-57, 154
n.25-26, 155 n.27 ("Despite the fact that United States copyright law was based largely on the
English model, early U.S. courts showed some reluctance to grant preliminary relief to copyright
plaintiffs. Of the reported copyright cases in the first fifty years of the republic, most refused to
grant preliminary injunctive relief, and on several occasions courts and commentators noted that the
American rule seemed less favorable to plaintiffs than the English case law.") (citing Ewer v. Coxe,
8 F. Cas. 917, 920 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4,584)); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 20-21, 21 n.70 (1994) (explaining
that in colonial America and early years of United States, copyright law was basically ignored).
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law" precedents would be mimicked, as the first American copyright
statute closely tracked the first British copyright (as opposed to press
licensing) statute. 46 The opinions of the justices in Millar v. Taylor,
including that of Lord Mansfield, a renowned champion of common-law
copyright, concluded that excerpting a work in an abridgment,
translation, imitation, or adaptation into verse was a lawful form of
speech. 147 Courts viewed extensive quotations or "abridgements" of one
and judgment that deserved
work in another as exercises of intelligence
148
independent protection, not censorship.
Madison and the other framers of the Constitution made such broad
statements as they did endorsing unlimited freedom to speak and publish
because they could not anticipate that copyright law could someday be
used to undermine an author's right to use a telling comparison,
quotation, or turn of phrase. 149 The statutory and common law of
146. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 116, at 696, 696 n.100-03 (citing Millar v. Taylor,
[1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.), and THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. at 602 (argument for appellants) ("The case
of Donaldson v. Beckett was decided in the house of lords in 1774. This case, and all the law on this
subject, discussed and decided by it, must have been known to the [Framers]. The opinion of the
judges in the case of Miller v. Taylor, must also have been familiar to them."); LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1968) (explaining that Millar v. Taylor

was the "first major English decision on copyright," decided under "English copyright act of 1709,"
the "model" for Copyright Act of 1790).
147. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) ("'Certainly,
bona fide imitations, translations and abridgments are different, and in respect of property, may be
considered new works .... [The public] may improve [a work], imitate it, translate it, oppose [it];
but [has] no right to publish the identical work."') (citing Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201,
225-26 (K.B.) (explaining that copyright is a limited monopoly consisting in the "sole right of
printing and publishing" a book, not an absolute property right to prevent a new work based on an
abridgement, improvement, imitation, translation, or appropriation of the conceptions thereof)).
148. See Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173-74 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) ("A fair
abridgment of any book is considered a new work, as to write it requires labor and exercise of
judgment.... All the authorities agree that to abridge requires the exercise of the mind, and that it is
not copying.") (citing Strahan v. Newberry, [1773] 98 Eng. Rep. 775 (Ch.), and Gyles v. Wilcox,
[1740] 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (Ch.)); see also Dodsley v. Kinnersley, [1761] 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271
(Ch.); WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-9 (2d ed. 1995) (citing
these and other cases holding that republishing a "new work" that copies largely from an old one
was legal in late 1700s).
149. See Governor Randolph, Address (June 10, 1788), in JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 203
http://memory.loc.gov/cgiat
available
ed.,
1888),
Franklin
(Burt
(1799-1800)
bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(ed0032)).
The liberty of the press is supposed to be in danger. If this were the case, it would
produce extreme repugnancy in my mind. If it ever will be suppressed in this country, the
liberty of the people will not be far from being sacrificed. Where is the danger of it? He
says that every power is given to the general government that is not reserved to the states.
Pardon me if I say the reverse of the proposition is true. I defy any one to prove the
contrary. Every power not given it by this system is left with the states. This being the
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copyright was much more circumscribed in their day, resembling a
regulation of unfair competition between printing houses rather than an
excuse to quibble over imitation or quotation in a new work. 5 ° The
Copyright Act of 1790, like the Statute of Anne, restricted its attention to
printing, reprinting, and vending entire books, rather than nitpicking
about excessive quotations, similar characters, or unacknowledged
influences.' 5' The Copyright Revision Act of 1831 similarly granted the
public the "right to produce abridged or translated versions" of
52
copyrighted books.1

principle, from what part of the Constitution can the liberty of the press be said to be in
danger?
Id.
150. Copyright in the eighteenth century operated "primarily as a trade regulation deviceacting in the interest of society by preventing monopoly, and in the interest of the publisher by
protecting published works from piracy ....
" PATTERSON, supra note 146, at 14; see also Sara K.
Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 933 (2007); L. Ray Patterson &
Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 936 (2003) ("[A] reasonable inference is that
the state legislators [who ratified the Constitution] viewed the copyright statute as a trade regulation
act for the temporary benefit of authors but for the long-term benefit of the public as a whole ....
");
OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 289

(June 2005) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School), available at
http://www.obracha.net/oi/OI5.pdf ("The only entitlement awarded by copyright was.., the trade
privilege of the publisher ...to print and sell a particular text .... The [1790 Copyright] Act is,
rather, based on the traditional trade-centered concepts of verbatim reproduction of texts and the sale
of such verbatim copies. The transformation of a map, chart and book into the intellectual work and
the broader notion of ownership of such a work [and its protection against non-verbatim copying]
were yet to come."). Since then, copyright law has swept more and more private non-competitive
conduct under its regulatory purview:
Changes to the law have also enabled courts to punish private violations of those rights.
Before July 8, 1870, when Congress added the word "copying" to the list of exclusive
rights in the statute, copyright owners enjoyed only the exclusive rights of "printing,
reprinting, publishing, and vending" their works. Because those rights related to
publication in print, the exercise of those rights tended to involve public acts. Today, by
contrast, section 106 of the Copyright Act provides copyright owners with the exclusive
right of reproduction, which-unlike the exclusive rights of "printing, reprinting,
publishing and vending"-is violated whenever the work is "fixed" in a "material
object[]" (such as the memory devices of a home computer). The invasion of rights under
copyright law, like the creation of those rights, is now, in many cases, a private act.
Stadler, supra, at 933.
151. See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1793-94 (2002)
(explaining that under the Copyright Act of 1790, "the actual scope of protection" was "slight,"
because "you could translate or adapt or abridge or set to song copyrighted works, without the
permission of the author ... ," as well as set up "pirate presses" to republish foreign works without
restraint); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 517, 534 n.l 19 (1990) (opining that the Statute of Anne and Copyright Act of 1790
"adopted a very limited view of infringement").
152. Judith L. Marley, Guidelines Favoring Fair Use: An Analysis of Legal Interpretations
Affecting Higher Education, 25 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 367, 368 (1999). Justice Story had an
"intense dislike" for the fair abridgement doctrine, first grafting "many qualifications" onto it and
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Moreover, by imposing a series of "formalities" and a relatively
short fourteen-year initial term of protection,1 53 the Copyright Act of
1790 "helped to maintain copyright's traditional balance between
providing private incentives to authors and preserving a robust stock of
public domain works from which future creators could draw."'15 4 In 1790,
an author of a book had to be a citizen or resident of the United States,
deposit a copy of its title in a district clerk's office, publish the clerk's
record in a newspaper for four weeks, and deliver a copy of the book to
the Secretary of State within six months of publishing it.' 55 Eliminating
publication and the other formalities expands the scope of regulation and
shrinks the public domain to a shadow of what it otherwise would have
been, 156 and means that copyright law is now "the principal barrier to the
[digital distribution and] creative reuse of [many books] that under the
of 1790] would not have been subject to copyright in the
[Copyright ' Act
157
first place."
Breaking out of the "copyright cage" that regulates in byzantine,
lobbyist-driven detail what can and cannot be said in digital media will
require bold and creative thinking. 158 I suggest that courts and scholars
look to the common-law "contours" of copyright in 1791 for a more
principled basis with which to assess whether overbroad copyrights
unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of speech. Efforts to inhibit the
growth and development of the electronic press by shutting down fan
fiction sites and book search technology, or to restrict free eBook sites
from salvaging political and historical works condemned to obscurity by
out-of-print status, should receive much closer First Amendment

then eliminating it in favor of a vague ban on books tending to "[prejudice] the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects" of other books, which later became known as the fair use doctrine.
Id.
153. A renewal had to be filed after fourteen years to receive an additional fourteen years of
protection, a requirement which increased the size of the public domain by limiting the copyright
monopoly to books still being marketed after fourteen years. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1
Stat. 124; ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 55 (2d ed. 2006).
154. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004).
155. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 662-63, 667-68 (1834); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F.
Cas. 999, 1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872) (citing Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124).
156. See Sara K. Stadler, Forginga Truly UtilitarianCopyright,91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 631-33,
641 (2006).
157. Sprigman, supra note 154, at 489.
158. Jonathan Zittrain, The Copyright Cage, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 26, 29 (explaining
how our "astonishingly intricate copyright regime" establishes a "copyright cage" for many
individual users, but provides corporate users with "increasing numbers of exceptions,
counterexceptions, contractual agreements, and licenses").
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scrutiny.' 59 Helpful standards for these inquiries, I believe, may be found
in the common law of copyright.
IV.

A.

BROADBAND BANDITS AND NET NEUTRALITY

FirstAmendment Implications of Recent Efforts to Privatize and
DeregulateBroadbandInternetMarkets

Emerging First Amendment issues implicate the right of
oligopolistic owners of digital media infrastructure to block or
discriminate against uses of the infrastructure that threaten their political
ideology, business models, or market power. A notable example of this
phenomenon occurred during the initial invasion of Iraq, when an ISP
took down combat footage, claiming it was "adult content.' 60 Most ISPs
impose "acceptable use policies" with vague language allowing them to
shut down Web sites or remove
content they disagree with or that
16 1
"people may find offensive."'

In addition to censoring political speech, ISPs use "acceptable use"
policies to threaten upstart firms like Skype and Fon, which represent
p2p communications platforms of great power. 162 Skype is a voice over
Internet protocol or p2p voice communications technology, which turns
personal computers into not only inexpensive telephones but also full163
featured teleconferencing, videophone, and social networking tools.

Fon, on the other hand, is a company that is building a "grass-roots"

159. See Baker, supra note 12, at 904 ("The expressive liberty protected by the First
Amendment encompasses copying as a way of receiving or preserving personal access to speech and
distributing copies as a means of communicating to others what the distributor wants to
communicate.").
160. See Tim Grieve, No Dead Bunnies, No Dead Soldiers, SALON.COM, Mar. 25, 2003,
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/03/25/yellowtimes/index.html.
161. Caron Carlson, ISPs Grapple With Censorship, EWEEK, Mar. 31, 2003, at I (quoting
Andrew Ulmer, an attorney with Simpson Partners LLP). AT&T, the largest broadband provider in
North America, is now planning to delete Internet users' communications by means of automated
technology that would likely provide little regard for fair use or First Amendment rights. See James
S. Granelli, AT&T to Target Pirated Content; It Joins Hollywood in Trying to Keep Bootleg
Material Off Its Network, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at C1; The Windsor Oaks Group LLC, Voice
of Broadband,
http://www.broadbandtrends.com/Newsletters/Volume3_2007/TheVoice-of
BroadbandVol3_Issue_3.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2007) (AT&T/BellSouth accounted for 18.9%
of North American broadband connections in 2006, ahead of second-largest broadband provider
Comcast).

162. See Ethan Todras-Whitehill, When a Stranger Calls, From Afar or Nearby, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2005, at GI; Skype Ltd., Skype Explained: P2P Telephony Explained-For Geeks Only,
http://www.skype.com/download/explained.html (last visited July 28, 2007).
163. See supra note 162.
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community that lets Internet users "share access across their wireless
1 64
[i.e., Wi-Fi] networks to their broadband Internet access connections."
With about 400,000 users worldwide, Fon sells Wi-Fi transmitters, or
routers, which permit other Fon users who share access to their own
broadband connections (or who pay for access without sharing their
own) to access the Web when they are away from home.1 65 Some ISPs
to share their
call this "stealing"; they claim that users cannot "choose
' 66
Internet access connections with anyone off the street."'
Both Skype and Fon potentially implicate high-speed ISPs'
"acceptable use" policies, which purport to prohibit "high volume" use,
commercial resale or similar noncommercial use, or use by persons
outside the premises, without regard to whether such uses harm the
network or other users.' 67 High-speed Internet providers like the DSL
and cable companies are buying up software to "block... Internet
applications such as phone calls, video and photo downloads.' 68 The
creators of the Internet and World Wide Web warn that such
discrimination against speech-enhancing uses of the Internet threatens
and new technologies desired by users, rather
the free exchange of ideas 169
than network gatekeepers.
Joanie Wexler, What's FON Up Against?: The Issue of Shared Public Wi-Fi Nets,
2006, http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/wireless/
8,
Nov.
WORLD,
2006/I 106wireless2.html.
165. See Startups to Watch, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/
biz2/0702/gallery.nextnet.biz2/11l.html (last visited 'Aug. 26, 2007); Fon Establishes Major US
27, 2007,
REPORTER, Apr.
Time Warner Cable, ONLINE
Beachhead, Lands
http://www.onlinereporter.com/article.php?article-id=9366; Tom Sowa, The Joy of Sharing: Fon
Offers Wireless Social Networking for Members, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Wash.), Oct. 9, 2006, at
164.

NETWORK

All.

166. Wexler, supranote 164.
167. See, e.g., AT&T, AT&T DSL Service Subscriber Agreement, §§ 8.a.-c., 10.a.-b.,
http://www.att.net/general-info/terms-dsl-data.html (last visited July 28, 2007); AT&T / Yahoo!,
Terms of Service pts. 3, 14, http://edit.client.yahoo.com/cspcommon/static?page--tos (last visited
July 28, 2007); Comcast, Comcast High-Speed Internet Acceptable Use Policy § ix,
http://www.comcast.net/terms/use.jsp (last visited July 28, 2007); Time Warner Cable, Time Warner
6,
4.b.i.-iii.,
pts.
at
Agreement,
Subscriber
Services
Residential
Cable
http://help.twcable.com/html/twc-subagreement2.html (last visited July 28, 2007); Verizon Online,
3.7.5,
3.7.1,
pt.
3.6.1,
of Service,
Service Terms
Access
Internet
Verizon
(last visited July 28, 2007); John
http://www.verizon.net/policies/vzcom/tos.popup.asp
Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband: Preserving an Open Internet Through Net
Neutrality, at 19-20 (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep20060206.pdf; see also Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google's "Free
Lunch, "WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at DOI.
168. Peter Grant & Jesse Drucker, Phone, Cable Firms Rein In Consumers' Internet Use,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2005, at Al.
169. See Network Neutrality, supra note 2, at 8-9; Decentralized Information Group, timbl's
blog, Net Neutrality: This is Serious, http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/144 (June 21, 2006,
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The Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on such discrimination,
however, by holding in 2004 and 2005 that neither antitrust nor federal
"open access" laws force telephone or cable companies not to
discriminate against smaller competitors or disfavored uses. 170 These
cases, which reinforced barriers to entry confronted by municipalities
and upstart private companies desiring to offer high-speed Internet
access to the public, may be illustrative of a growing tendency toward
"corporate socialism" in American media and the global economy more
generally.1 71 Corporate socialism views every increase in corporate
4:35p.m.); Decentralized Information Group, timbl's blog, Neutrality on the Net,
http://dig.csail.mit.eduIbreadcrumbs/node/132 (May 2, 2006, 3:22p.m.).
170. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 973-75
(2005) (holding that "common carrier" and "telecommunications" nondiscrimination regulations
under Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not apply to providers of "information" services, such as
cable broadband); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
411-16 (2004) (holding that federal antitrust law does not impose nondiscrimination obligations on
telecommunications providers); see also Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atd. Corp., 398 F.3d 666,
669-76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (extending reasoning of Trinko case to claim by DSL broadband provider
that incumbent monopolist discriminated against its requests for interconnection); Covad Commc'ns
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,855, 14,862 (2005) (extending reasoning of Brand X case to
DSL broadband).
171. See Walter Adams, Antitrust and a Free Economy, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 794, 797 (1977)
(describing how oligopoly power has political consequences, including "disproportionate influence
on the making of laws," as well as on their "interpretation," which result in mini-states "in the
disguise of merchants-largely immune from social control but with a vested claim on government
bailouts. In short, it helps convert a decentralized power structure into a camouflaged system of
corporate socialism"); Leonard M. Baynes, Making the Case for a Compelling Governmental
Interest and Re-Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing, 57
RUTGERS L. REV. 235, 292-93 (2004) (quoting critics who assail FCC auctions of exclusive
communications licenses as "corporate socialism" that hurts small business); Charles A. Reich,
Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle Americans and the Poor, 71
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 817, 823 (1996) ("As a result of the denial of true ownership to individuals,
corporations, along with a small group of very rich individuals, have become the principal owners of
the nation's wealth. This has produced an economy that might be described as 'corporate
socialism'-a system that combines the worst features of socialism and capitalism.... Corporations
possess the planning and allocation powers of socialist bureaucracies, but these powers are exercised
only on behalf of the corporations themselves.... A general decline of living standards for the
majority of Americans has been the result, accompanied by growing disparities of wealth ....);
Peter H. Schuck & Robert E. Litan, Regulatory Reform in the Third World: The Case of Peru, 4
YALE J. ON REG. 51, 64 (1986) (describing new "corporate socialism" or "mercantilism" in Latin
America that involves "the 'regulatory capture' of vote-seeking politicians by rent-seeking corporate
interests" at the expense of "competitive markets"); Peter H. Shuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90
YALE L.J. 702, 707-10 (1981) (book review) (describing how FCC and other federal agencies that
regulate specific industries are susceptible to capture by those industries' leaders and therefore result
in maintenance of cartels and in "'corporate socialism,"' to "regressively tax consumers,"
impoverish small firms, inhibit new entry, "stifle innovation, and "diminish consumer choice");
Russell Dean Covey, Note, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: Separation of Powers and National
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profits as a near-automatic increase in products and services that benefit
the public, on the assumption that profits are "reinvested" in them. 72 As
a mindset, it is exemplified by cases like Eldred, San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, and Harper & Row that assume without any evidence that
every increase in federal monopolies benefits173the public by prompting
reinvestment in quality products and services.
Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE L.J. 1311, 1311-12, 1337 n.134-36 (1996)
(describing how former manager of $5 billion in Mexican investments at Goldman Sachs became
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and lobbied for legislation that forced U.S. taxpayers to contribute in
excess of $20 billion to bail out investors in Mexican securities, in a form of "corporate socialism").
One might disagree with Professor Reich's assertion about living standards, if regarded on average,
but his point becomes clear if the percentage of children living in poverty is examined. See U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN &

YOUTH 48 (1997), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/97trends/esl-3.htm ("Between 1975 and
1993, the proportion of children living in extreme poverty, that is, at or below 50 percent of the
poverty line doubled from 5 percent in 1975 to 10 percent by 1993.") (footnote omitted); FEDERAL
INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL

INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 2005 19 (2005) (noting that seven percent of children lived in extreme
poverty in 2003); OECD, STARTING STRONG II: EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE 426
(2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/14/37423831.pdf (explaining that the U.S.
child poverty rate is twice the average of other developed countries).
172. This is known as the "Schumpeterian hypothesis" in economic literature, i.e., "that
dominant firms innovate more than their competitively structured counterparts" because a firm with
monopoly power "would enjoy greater demand for innovation by virtue of its ability to profit from
its inventions," and "generate a greater supply of innovations relative to its competitive
counterparts," making monopoly the "'most powerful engine of [economic] progress."' Jim Chen,
Standing in the Shadows of Giants: The Role of IntergenerationalEquity in Telecommunications
Reform, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 948 (2000) (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 (1942)). As one might have expected, it lacks empirical support.
See id. at 950 (calling empirical support for the theory "elusive"). The Schumpeterian hypothesis is
contrary to observed behavior in the case of the Internet. AT&T and its heirs-the "Baby Bell" DSL
providers-tried mightily to restrict the growth and high-speed uses of the Internet, AT&T to protect
its proprietary telephone network monopoly and later investments in cable broadband networks, and
the Baby Bells to preserve the profits they earn due to underutilization of DSL's total high-speed
access capacity. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 27-45, 90, 148, 154-55, 158, 168; Travis, supra note
10, at 1714 (noting that Bell Labs had invented DSL by 1980 and Baby Bells could have offered it
to Americans in 1980s or early 1990s but chose not to do so to protect existing revenue streams);
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, PRINCIPLES FOR AN OPEN BROADBAND FUTURE 6-7 (2005),
Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
www.publicknowledge.org/doc/open-broadband-future.doc;
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J.ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 147, 152-154, 156-65
(2003). In actuality, reinvesting revenue from monopoly and duopoly exploitation of DSL and cable
networks tends to reduce corporate profits, leading to inadequate investment and the breaking of
corporate promises of wider access. See FMEA, supra note 11, at 9-10, 17.
173. See Eldred v. Reno, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003) (upholding copyright term extension
because Congress "rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage copyright
holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works"); id. at 248-49, 253
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that majority's decision will actually "impede preservation [of
American movie heritage] by forbidding the reproduction of films within their own or within other
public collections," that copyright owners allowed half of feature films made before 1950 to be lost
or destroyed, that extension "will mean the transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 17
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1519

A similar equation between corporate profits and public benefit may
be at the root of the Court's rulings that neither antitrust nor
telecommunications law has much to say about discriminatory and
74
anticompetitive conduct in the market for high-speed Internet access.
According to traditional First Amendment analysis, which too often
ignores the broader political and structural significance of a restraint on
of existing copyrights-copyrights that, together, already will have earned many billions of dollars
in royalty 'reward,"' and that in practice "the likely amounts of extra royalty payments are large
enough to suggest that unnecessarily high prices will unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic
works"); San Francisco Arts & Athl., Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987)
(upholding Act of Congress prohibiting some nonconfusing, noncommercial uses of words because
"exclusive control" of words and trademarks helps "to ensure that the [owner] receives the benefit of
its own efforts so that the [owner] will have an incentive to continue to produce a 'quality product,'
that, in turn, benefits the public"); id. at 568, 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that majority's
decision actually "creates the potential for significant suppression of protected speech" and will
result in "commercial monopolization of [noncommercial] language that otherwise belongs in the
public domain"); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1985)
(rejecting First Amendment right to excerpt former President's memoirs because he and his
publisher "invested extensive resources in creating an original work and are poised to release it to
the public, no legitimate aim is served by pre-empting the right of first publication." and because
"copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas"); id. at 589, 603
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that court actually deployed "the statutory monopoly" of copyright
to "choke off multifarious indirect uses and consequent broad dissemination of information and
ideas," and to allow plaintiffs to "monopolize revenue from that potential market" for information
about Nixon and Ford presidencies by using "copyright as a shield from competition in that
market").
174. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000-02 (rejecting argument that FCC should be held to prior
decisions determining that regulations against anticompetitive discrimination in high-speed Internet
markets are needed, and instead praising FCC for engaging in a "fresh analysis" that emphasized
why "broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes
investment and innovation in a competitive market") (citation and internal quotations omitted);
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (holding that "possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system[!]," because the "opportunity to charge monopoly prices... induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth"); Thomas 0. Barnet, Remarks at Hearings Regarding
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, The Gales of Creative Destruction: The Need for Clear and Objective
Standards for Enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act 6 (June 20, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/216738.htm (opining that Trinko "is in accord with
Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter's observation that high profits serve as 'baits that lure capital
on to untried trails,' ... resulting in better ways to satisfy our needs and desires"); Eleanor M. Fox,
Is There Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of The Sherman Act, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 155, 159, 167 (2005) ("The Court [in Trinko] held that even monopoly firms
have the fundamental right to refuse to deal and that exceptions to this rule should be narrowly
construed.... [The Court stated that:] 'Judicial oversight under the Sherman Act would seem
destined to distort investment.. . .' Some scholars have concluded that the Supreme Court has now
adopted a sacrifice-of-profits rule[!] for a Section 2 violation."); Christopher S. Yoo. Beyond
Network Neutrality 63 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Group, Paper No. 05-20, 2005), available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/net-neutrality/2005yoo.pdf
("Schumpeter's vision thus rejects the classic model of horizontal competition within the market in
favor of competition among a succession of monopolists ....").
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speech, such conduct would be an unproblematic result of contract law, a
rule of general applicability, having an incidental content-neutral effect
on speech. 175 "Contract with another provider, if you don't like the
acceptable use policies of the one you have," this doctrine would tell
Internet users. The analysis is not so simple in the broadband Internet
context, however, because most potential new DSL and cable modem
providers have been prohibited from offering another alternative by
decades of anticompetitive legislation prohibiting new entry. 76 Local
franchising laws prohibit or severely restrict competitive entry into the
cable and DSL core of the high-speed Internet market.177
175. Cf Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) ("[G]enerally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news .... The press may not with impunity
break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news."); id. at 676 n.4 (Blackmun, J., joined by
Marshall, J., and Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for ignoring principle that judicial
"imposition of civil liability based on protected expression constitutes 'punishment' of speech for
First Amendment purposes"); id. at 677-78 (Souter, J., joined by Blackmun, J., Marshall, J., and
O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws of general applicability "may restrict First Amendment
rights just as effectively as those directed specifically at speech itself," and that courts should be
wary of finding waiver of First Amendment rights by contract because such a finding is based on an
erroneous "conception of First Amendment rights as those of the speaker alone," whereas it "'goes
beyond ... the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw"') (citation omitted).
176. Although alternatives to monopolistic DSL and cable modem providers are theoretically
available in the form of TI lines, fiber-optic connections, Wi-Fi, broadband over power lines,
satellite Internet, etc., these options are not technologically or commercially viable for most
residential customers, over ninety-five percent of whom stick with the duopoly of cable and DSL.
See FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2006, tbl. 3 &

chart 6 (Jan. 2007), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/
IAD/hspdOI07.xls; H.R. REP. No. 109-541, at 7 (June 29, 2006); Wayne Rash, Net Neutrality
Advocates
Face
Off,
EWEEK
(July
17,
2006),
http://www.eweek.com/
article2/0,1895,1990357,00.asp; FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF

DECEMBER 31, 2005, tbl.3 & chart 6 (July 2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs.public/attachmatch/DOC-266596Al.pdf. Wireless and satellite broadband market share
plunged nearly sixty percent from 1999 to 2004 compared to DSL and cable share. See Roy Mark,
Same Broadband Numbers, Different Conclusions, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 26, 2005,
http://www.intemetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3530416.
177. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 633 (1994) ("Congress
concluded that due to 'local franchising requirements and the extraordinary expense of constructing
more than one cable television system to serve a particular geographic area,' the overwhelming
majority of cable operators exercise a monopoly over cable service.") (quoting Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 2(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
(1992)); Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Rules to Ensure Reasonable Franchising Process for New
Video Market Entrants (Dec. 20, 2006), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/attachmatch/DOC269111 AI.pdf ("[T]he current operation of the [cable] franchising process constitutes an
unreasonable barrier to entry that impedes the achievement of the interrelated federal goals of
enhanced cable competition and accelerated broadband deployment."); Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order on Remand and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978, 17,028-41, 17,046 (2003) (explaining
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Nearly half of all Americans have only one broadband provider to
choose from, and many of the rest have only one other choice, which
will inevitably impose nearly identical use restrictions. 178 As courts have
recognized in the context of FCC licensing of broadcast frequencies, this
is "a system in which the government excludes everyone from access to
the media unless the approval of governmentally appointed caretakers
(i.e., the licensees), is first secured.' ' 179 Broadband operators with
municipal franchises serve "as administrators of a highly valuable
communications resource, [and should be] subject to First Amendment
constraints."18 0 A searching First Amendment inquiry should occur when
the government "confers [a] right on licensees to prevent others from
[communicating in violation of] an unconditional monopoly of a scarce
resource which the [g]overnment has denied others the right to use."' 181
Laws purporting to restrict cities and counties from expanding their
citizens' access to the Internet may be even more detrimental from the
that DSL and cable modem providers are the beneficiaries of many exclusive government
franchises); Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1264
(1999) (telephone companies created by breakup of AT&T long enjoyed a "near monopoly inside"
regional areas); Kahn, supra note 2, at 184 (advocating federal action to "eliminate the thousands of
local franchising regulations that restrict competitive entry and provisioning of broadband access
services"); id. at 179-80 (noting that cable companies are "beneficiaries of exclusive territorial
franchises," similar to FCC broadcast licenses); Travis, supra note 10, at 1709-10 (describing
creation of "local telephone monopolies" by AT&T and its heirs, and "exclusive franchise rights"
creating cable monopolies in many local markets, with over ninety-five percent of local areas in the
United States having no effective choice between cable companies in 2004); Patricia M. Worthy,
Racial Minorities and the Quest to Narrow the Digital Divide: Redefining the Concept of
"Universal Service, "26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 10 n.27 (2003) (noting long tradition of
granting exclusive franchises to telephone networks); FMEA, supra note 11, at II (DSL and cable
modem providers obtain "exclusive franchises ... to serve a particular geographic area," which
prevent competition with providers like BellSouth or Comcast).
178. See Celia Viggo Wexler & Dawn Holian, Senators Mull an Internet with Restrictions, THE
NATION, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060220/wexler. For use restrictions
common to both cable modem and DSL providers, see supra note 167.
179. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1131-32 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 355, 366 (9th Cir. 1979); accord Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389,
396 (1969) (opining that the effect of FCC licensing is that a licensee gets to "monopolize a radio
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens ... ," which monopoly may nevertheless be subject
to regulation such as the "fairness doctrine"); cf Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 236 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("'What is happening to-day is that the National
Broadcasting Co., which is a part of the great Radio Trust, to say the least, if not a monopoly,
is ...forcing the little stations off the board so that the people cannot hear anything except the one
program."') (quoting 68 CONG. REc. 3031 (1927)).
180. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
181. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 25 n.115 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 390-91).
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standpoint of the public's access to digital media. These laws, which
cable and DSL firms lobby for, hobble cities' efforts to reduce the cost
and expand the accessibility of high-speed Internet access to their
residents as a public service. 82 More than a dozen states have laws
restricting cities and counties from setting up high-speed networks over
cable, DSL, fiber-optic, broadband over power-lines, or Wi-Fi. 183 These
public networks, when they are allowed, reinvigorate lazy monopolies
and duopolies, 184 and bridge the digital divide between high-income and
low-income Americans, between European-Americans and AfricanAmericans or Latinos, and between suburban and central-city or rural
residents. 185 The more broadband competitors there are, public or
182. See Neal Peirce, City-Sponsored Wi-Fi's Wild Ride, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2002446112-peirce2l.html;
Bruce Fein, Choking
Broadband Competition, BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 28, 2005, at 74.
183. See 151 CONG. REc. 85, S7203, S7298 (daily ed. June 23, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (declaring that fourteen states restrict municipal broadband); Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere,
supra note 10, at 1765-71 (summarizing legislation of this kind in Alabama, Florida, Iowa,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington State, and Wisconsin, and state constitutional law rules that might have this effect in
California, Illinois, and New York);

CALIFORNIA PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, DRAFT REPORT ON

app. B (2004), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
PUBLISHED/COMMENTDECISION/43588.htm (listing thirty-two states restricting municipal
broadband as of 2004).
184. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 181 n.66; Harvey Reiter, The Contrasting Policies of the FCC
and FERC Regarding the Importance of Open Transmission Networks in Downstream Competitive
Markets, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 243, 298 (2005); Harvey L. Reiter & Stephen P. Chinn, Municipal
Entry into Telecommunications and Cable Services: Benefits and Barriers,44 MUNICIPAL LAW. 14,
17 n.34 (2003); Montgomery Van Wart, Dianne Rahm & Scott Sanders, Economic Development
and Public Enterprise: The Case of Rural Iowa's Telecommunication Utilities, 14 ECON. DEV. Q.
131, 142 (2000).
185. See In re Missouri Mun. League, 16 F.C.C.R. 1157, 1162 (2001) (reasoning that
municipal telecommunications utilities can help "bring the benefits of competition to all Americans,
particularly those who live in small or rural communities"), rev'd, 299 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2002),
rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004); FCC, AVAILABILITY OF
BROADBAND

ADVANCED

DEPLOYMENT

IN

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

CALIFORNIA,

CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, FOURTH REPORT TO

CONGRESS 36-37, (2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachment/FCC-04208Al.pdf; NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., FALLING THROUGH THE NET: DEFINING THE

DIGITAL DIVIDE 5-9 (1999), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/FTTN.pdf
(describing the "digital divide" on demographic and geographic lines); Steve Alexander, Wi-Fi
network Will Help Fund Tech Initiative, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, June 12, 2007,
http://www.startribune.com/
154/story/1241548.html (describing how citywide Wi-Fi network to be debuted in Minneapolis area
in late 2007 will help residents afford new technologies and make access "ubiquitous"); Cisco
Systems
Inc.,
The
Ethnic
Divide,
http://www.cisco.com/web/leaming/
netacad/digital-divide/issues/DigitalEthnic.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2007); Lee Gomes, Despite
Opposition, Might the Web Need a New Government Jolt?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2005, at BI
(noting that municipal Wi-Fi networks promise to improve service to underserved communities in
Philadelphia); Helena Lindskog & Magnus Johansson, Broadband: A Municipal Information
Platform: Swedish Experience, 31 INT'L J. OF TECH. MGMT. 47, 59, 61-62 (2005) (stating that
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will be and the more people will enjoy better
private, the lower prices
86
access to information.'
After hearing testimony in 1995 about the benefits of entry by
public utilities into telecommunications, 18 7 Congress amended the
telecommunications laws to declare that any state law restricting the
ability of "any entity" to provide a telecommunications service would be
preempted.18 8 In 2004, however, the Supreme Court held that Congress

Sweden successfully used municipal broadband to bridge digital divide); Robert MacMillan,
2005,
June
27,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
to
WiFi,
in
Tunes
Congress
82
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/27/AR20050627004 .html
(discussing how Canada used municipal broadband subsidies to achieve wider access); Sonina
Matteo, Philly Goes Wild for Wi-Fi, EarthLink Races to Deploy Megamunicipal Mesh Network in
Philadelphia, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/research/
2007/080607-philadelphia-wifi.html; (describing how municipal Wi-Fi network in Philadelphia will
"Web access for low-income families"); Robert W. McChesney & John Podesta, Let There Be WiFi: Broadband is the Electricity of the 21st Century-and Much of America is Being Left in the
Dark, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 14, 15 (explaining that Japan achieved higher rate of
broadband access by encouraging municipalities to build broadband networks); Peter K. Yu,
Bridgingthe Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 12
(2002) ("[T]he high cost of Internet connection remains the major barrier to Internet access."); see
also Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere, supra note 10, at 1780, 1783 (opining that in the U.S., municipal
broadband is bridging "suburban-rural digital divide" and has the "potential... to bridge racial and
socioeconomic digital divides").
186. See Steven C. Carlson, A Historical, Economic, and Legal Analysis of Municipal
Ownership of the Information Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1999); AM.
PUB. POWER ASS'N, COMMUNITY BROADBAND:

SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION 21 (2004),

http://www.appanet.org/files/PDFs/BroadbandFactFiction.pdf; HAROLD FELD ET AL., CONNECTING
(2005),
12-14
BROADBAND
MUNICIPAL
ABOUT
TRUTH
THE
PUBLIC:
THE
http://www.mediaaccess.org/MunicipalBroadbandWhitePaper.pdf;

RICHARD CADMAN & CHRIS

DINEEN, BROADBAND AND 12010: THE IMPORTANCE OF DYNAMIC COMPETITION TO MARKET
GROWTH 2 (2005), http://www.spcnetwork.co.uk/uploads/2005022l broadband_analysis.pdf.
187. See The Communications Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 1822 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 103d Cong. 354-55 (1994) (statement of William J. Ray, Manager,
Glasgow Electric Plant Board, on behalf of the APPA) (arguing that Congress should remove legal
"obstacles in the path to public ownership of new telecommunications facilities or the public
provision of telecommunications services," because "the goals of universal service and vigorous
competition can be enhanced if such public ownership and involvement is encouraged"); The
Communications Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 1822 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., &
Transp., 103d Cong. 379 (1994) (statement of Trent Lott, Senate Majority Leader) (opining that
"municipalities" are "positioned to make a real contribution in this telecommunications area").
188. See Missouri Mun. League v. FCC, 299 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2002), rev'd, Nixon v.
Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 128, 141 (2004); H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 127 (1996) (Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference explaining that Congress intended to
encourage entry by "electric, gas, water or steam utilities," so "[e]xisting state laws or
regulations ... are not preempted ....

However, explicit prohibitions on entry by a utility into

telecommunications are preempted .. "); 141 CONG. REC. S7801, 7906 (daily ed. June 7, 1995)
(noting that Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott stated that Congress wanted to pass "a framework
where everybody can compete everywhere in everything," and remove "all barriers to and
restrictions from competition .... ").
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had not been "plain" enough, under the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, about preempting state laws banning municipal
telecommunications entry. 189 This decision will suppress entry by major
potential competitors in the broadband Internet market, and perpetuate
the digital divide. 190 Two and a half years after the decision, the United
States ranks sixteenth in broadband access per one hundred inhabitants,
after Canada, several Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Switzerland, South Korea, Japan, and Israel.' 9'
B. A Free Speech Approach to Access to Information over the
BroadbandInternet
In recent decades, Congress, courts, and scholars have devoted
heightened scrutiny to the issues of the concentration and consolidation
of media ownership and control. Members of Congress have noted that
the increasing concentration of broadcast and Internet industry
ownership threatens the diversity of media expression.192 Twenty years
ago, Justice Brennan warned that broadcast station owners may seize an
"'unfettered power' to disseminate "'only their own views on public
issues,"' thus distorting public debate.' 93 Writing in a similar spirit,
Professor Jerome A. Barron had argued that while the mass media were
disingenuously invoking the First Amendment before the Supreme
189. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 132-33, 138, 140.
190. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
191. Missouri Municipal League was decided in March 2004, while the most recent
international broadband comparison is based on data from December 2006. See Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Key ICT Indicators (Dec. 2006),
https://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/32/38469057.xls.
192. See H.R. REP. No. 109-541, at 7-8 (2006) (noting that "most Americans are subject to a
broadband duopoly, many to a broadband monopoly, and some Americans (particularly in rural
areas) have no access to broadband Internet" and that therefore, "[f]irms that control networks that
provide access to the Internet may exercise market power to discriminate against rival services or
competing technologies," which will "threaten[] the open architecture that has been a key feature of
the Internet's success and utility"); S. REP. No. 108-141, at 2-3 (2003) (noting that "media
consolidation has resulted in substantial changes to the broadcast television programming market,"
with "five media conglomerates control[ling] 'about a 75 percent share of prime-time viewing'
and ... on pace to soon control roughly 'the same percentage of TV households in prime time as the
three networks did 40 years ago."' The "number of television station owners" was down "40 percent
since 1995," the "number of commercial radio station owners" was down "34 percent since 1996,"
and one "station group" gained control over 1150 stations previously controlled by its competitors);
145 CONG. REC. S12147, 12154 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1999) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (reasoning
that the continuation of an "unprecedented wave of mergers and concentration in the media and the
communications industries" threatens "the flow of information in democracy and whether a few are
going to control this").
193. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 398 (1984) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969)).
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Court, they were busy censoring controversial or disfavored views,
engaging in misleading depictions of the plight and aspirations of
minority groups, and ignoring critical political issues. 194 Professor
and
Barron favored extending broader rights of access to information
1' 95
opinion, rather than an unlimited right of corporations to "speak."
High-speed Internet access is a critical precondition for individual
liberty and democratic deliberation because traditional media suffer from
apparently irremediable bias in their political coverage. Since the 1960s,
many scholars, politicians, and journalists have argued that traditional
media deliberately suppress points of view that undermine established
notions of patriotism, foreign relations, religious orthodoxy,
consumerism, economic policy, and personal conduct. 196 The
demonization and stereotyping of minority groups and women have been
and remain endemic to traditional media.1 97 Other mass media may not

194. Professor Barron argued, among other things, that the public needed to be protected from
biased media information and skewed debates by more legally enforceable rights of neglected

"sides" of public debates to reply after the holder of a governmental broadcast monopoly (or
"license") has "taken a position." See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1646-47, 1657, 1661, 1663-64, 1677-78 (1967); Jerome

A. Barron, An Emerging FirstAmendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
487, 487-90, 500-01 (1969) [hereinafter Barron, Access]. For a discussion of the problem of"private
censorship" by the mass media when it denies members of the public effective access to
government-regulated communications infrastructure, see Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-92.
195. Barron, Access, supra note 194, at 1659-60, 1664. He also advocated giving constitutional
sanction to laws mandating retractions of false statements and publication of replies by criticized or
falsely characterized individuals. See id.
196. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 7-19, 193-213 (2002);
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 15-77 (1999); DANNY SCHECHTER, THE
MORE YOU WATCH, THE LESS You KNOW 445-62 (1997); HERBERT I. SCHILLER, CULTURE, INC.:
THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EXPRESSION 1, 5-7 (1989); C. Edwin Baker, Media
Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 903-04 (2002); Rachel Smolkin, A
Source of Encouragement, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Aug./Sept. 2005, at 31, available at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3909; PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS,
FEWER FAVOR MEDIA SCRUTINY OF POLITICAL LEADERS: PRESS "UNFAIR, INACCURATE AND
PUSHY" (Mar. 21, 1997), http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=l 12.

197.

See, e.g., Kathleen Jones, On Authority: Or, Why Women Are Not Entitled to Speak, in

FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT 119, 130-31 (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds., 1988); DENNIS ROME,
BLACK DEMONS: THE MEDIA'S DEPICTION OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MALE CRIMINAL
STEREOTYPE 46 (2004); JACK G. SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A

PEOPLE 1-2 (2001); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2332-33 (1989); Ediberto Romin, Who Exactly is Living La Vida

Loca?: The Legal and Political Consequences of Latino-Latina Ethnic and Racial Stereotypes in
Film and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 37, 42 (2000); S. Craig Watkins & Rana A.

Emerson, Feminist Media Criticism and Feminist Media Practices,571 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF
POL. & SOC. SCI. 151, 152-53 (Sept., 2000); Jennifer L. Pozner, Missing Since 9-11: Women's
Voices, NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 2001, at A43.
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be slanting the presentation of political and social questions; they are
avoiding ideas altogether in favor of mindless violence.1 98
The First Amendment implications of federal telecommunications
and antitrust policy are currently the subject of an important emerging
area of analysis and activism. Legislation proposed in Congress in 2006,
but allowed to languish throughout most of 2007, would have expanded
access to broadband by preempting laws against city-supported
networks.1 99 Perhaps even more important is proposed "net neutrality"
legislation that would restrict censorship by broadband providers of
lawful content, as well as discriminatory fees or other monopolistic
conduct in connection with Internet applications and content.20 0
Opponents of net neutrality requirements have opined that the First
Amendment rights of corporate owners of telecommunications
infrastructure should trump the First Amendment rights of individual
speakers and users of telecommunications media. Under this view, the
foremost free speech interests on the Internet are those of broadband
infrastructure owners, rather than the senders and recipients of Internet
speech such as Web content, blogs, eBooks, or online videos. z°
198. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 196, at 202-03, 385-88, 446; Ellen P. Goodman, Media
Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1436 (2004); Neil Hickey, Unshackling Big Media, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., July/Aug. 2001, at 30, 31, available at http://archives.cjr.org/year/01/4/
fcchickey.asp; James F. Hoge, Jr., Foreign News: Who Gives a Damn?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 48, 49-51, available at http://archives.cjr.org/year/97/6/foreign.asp; PARENTS
TELEVISION COUNCIL, TV BLOODBATH: VIOLENCE ON PRIME TIME BROADCAST TV 1 (2003),
http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/reports/stateindustryviolence/
ReportOnViolence.pdf.
199. See Communications, Consumer's Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S
2686, 109th Cong. § 502(c) (2d Sess. 2006) (preempting state laws that "may prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting any public provider from providing, to any person or any public or private
entity, advanced telecommunications capability"); Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and
Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. § 502 (2d Sess. 2006) (noting additional
restrictions against public competition with private broadband providers); S. REP. No. 109-355, tit.
5, at 213-17 (2006).
200. See Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. § 3 (2d
Sess. 2006) (prohibiting discrimination or additional charges by broadband providers in offering
services or interconnecting with another provider, and interfering with consumers' ability to use the
network service "to access, to use, to send, to receive, or to offer lawful content, applications or
services over the Internet," or their ability to use digital devices on the network that do not
materially degrade the network's other uses); Network Neutrality Act of 2006, H.R. 5273, 109th
Cong. § 4 (2d Sess. 2006) (prohibiting, among other things, discrimination or blocking of
consumers' ability to send or receive lawful content, use applications over broadband including the
Internet, or attach and use any device that does not materially degrade the network).
201. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 1,
47-48 (2005) ("The fact that telecommunications networks now serve as the conduit for mass
communications and not just person-to-person communications greatly expands the justification for

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

57

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 17
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1519

This line of argument misconceives both the distinctive character of
the Internet and the purposes for which the First Amendment was
enacted. The Internet and its principal applications such as the World
Wide Web grew as rapidly as they did because they were designed to be
open, flexible, and uninhibited by gatekeeper control. 0 2 The high degree
of concentration in the broadband market, the inability of many
consumers to switch broadband carriers, and plans by broadband
providers to discriminate among different sources of Internet content,
20 3
combine to threaten "the open, decentralized platform of the Internet.,
Such an assault on the distinctive qualities of the Internet would erode its
unlimited,
capacity, praised by the Supreme Court, to provide20"relatively
4
low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.
The First Amendment, moreover, is not offended by regulations
designed to ensure that beneficiaries of telecommunications monopolies
exercise their power to restrict mass communication in a manner
consistent with the public interest. 20 5 The overriding purpose of the First
allowing [broadband infrastructure owners] to exercise editorial control over the information they
convey. In the process, it further weakens the case in favor of network neutrality."); Randolph J.
May, Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 3 I/S: J. L. &
POL. FOR THE INFORMATION SOC. 197, 198, 202-4 (2007) (arguing that "net neutrality" laws violate

First Amendment rights of broadband companies such as AT&T and Comcast, because they are
engaging in "speech" when they censor Internet content, so forcing them to transmit information or
opinions with which they disagree constitutes compelled speech).
202. See Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th
Cong. 7-9 (2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist,
Google, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf; Digital Future of the
United States: Part I-The Future of the World Wide Web: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, 110th Cong. 2-5 (2007)
(statement of Sir Timothy Bemers-Lee, 3Com Founders Chair, Computer Science and Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory, Decentralized Information Group, Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs/I I0-ti_hrg030I07.Sir-Timat
available
Testimony.pdf.
203. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th Cong.
7-9 (2006) (testimony of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google,
Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf. See also Applications for
Consent to Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203 (July 21, 2006)
(Copps, Commissioner, dissenting) ("1 believe that ceding gatekeeper control over the content we
receive in our homes to fewer and fewer media distributors is something that should alarm us.
Combining content and conduit is, after all, the classic strategy for monopoly or control by a
");Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network
privileged few ....
Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 154 (2006) ("By threatening to ban, block, or extract the value
from online communication, [broadband service providers] reduce the incentive to create new
technologies, and they threaten to erode the remarkable ethos of unpaid online production. Even if
rare, the mere possibility of [this kind of] censorship is a clear danger to First Amendment values.").
204. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
205. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (federal law requiring
cable television providers to carry local broadcast stations on their systems did not necessarily
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Amendment is to ensure that readers, listeners, and viewers of public
debates obtain access to a wide variety of facts and opinions so as to be
able to discern the truth as best they can.2 °6 Even privileging the
speaker's perspective, surely the First Amendment interests of the
creators, editors, and aggregators of Web sites, blogs, and online
videos-rather than the supposed "speech" interests of the owners of the
wires along
which content travels-should prevail in the event of a
20 7
conflict.

The claim that net neutrality laws violate the First Amendment is
particularly unpersuasive in that all broadband providers already allow
users to access a plethora of offensive content with which they surely
disagree as an editorial matter, undermining any suggestion that
violate First Amendment because law was justified without reference to the content of the local
stations, and there had been no finding that practical effects of the law would be to force cable
systems to drop other channels or otherwise change their programming selections); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (federal statute forbidding on-the-air use of indecent or obscene
language did not violate First Amendment because federal government had legitimate interest in
curtailing broadcasters' ability to intrude into their listeners' homes with offensive and indecent
materials); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (federal regulations that forced radio
and television broadcasters to, among other things, give fair coverage of public issues, did not
violate the First Amendment because broadcasters had no right to monopolize government licenses
with the effect of distorting public debate); compare Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974) (state law guaranteeing political candidates "right of reply" to attacks in newspapers on
their personal characters or official records violated First Amendment because newspapers exercised
editorial control over their contents; newspapers in question were not licensed to operate by federal
government or otherwise empowered to inhibit use of telecommunications media).
206. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226-27 (1997) (Breyer, J. concurring)
("First Amendment seeks to achieve" vigorous "public discussion and informed deliberation" of
issues, and to ensure "that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources."); Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (overriding concern of First Amendment is that "the people as a whole retain
their interest in free speech by [telecommunications] and their collective right to have the medium
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment"); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, 'presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritative selection."') (citation omitted). As Justice White held in Red Lion:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee. "Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government."
395 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted).
207. See Herman, supra note 203, at 113-14 (First Amendment interests of "each content
creator or end-user as her own editor of the Internet" should prevail over asserted interest in
"editorial control for broadband providers"); Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to
Eliminate Common CarriageThreatens FreeSpeech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REv. 483,
505 (2006) ("Telecommunications carriers, as providers of only transmission facilities, bear the
obligations of common carriers but possess no First Amendment rights.").
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broadband companies are like the editors of newspapers. 20 8 Net
neutrality would inflict minimal .harm on broadband providers' First
Amendment interests, because they would continue to carry the vast
majority of Internet content whether required to by law or not. 0 9
The Supreme Court has yet to decide any First Amendment claims
by citizens whose speech or access to information have been restricted
by local cable or DSL broadband providers imposing "acceptable use"
requirements under cover of existing or historical exclusive municipal
franchises. When these cases arise, however, I believe that the Court
should scrutinize such restrictions on speech very closely, and keep in
mind that Madison, Jefferson, and other constitutional framers conceived
of the freedom of speech as a citizen's right to receive information
relating to self-government. Madison wrote that: "A popular government
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
208. Unlike cable system operators, which develop original programming and "'exercis[e]
editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in [their] repertoire,"' broadband
providers typically do not develop a significant portion of the Internet content accessed by their
users, and do not exercise much discretion over which e-mails or Web sites to include in the public
Internet. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 636 (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc.,
476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)); See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1095, 1096-1102, 1108-11 (2005) (noting that Internet contains Web sites that "makes it easier for
people to commit" dozens of crimes); Paul Przybylski, Note, A Common Tool for Individual
Solutions: Why Countries Should Establish an International Organization to Regulate Internet
Content, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 927, 952-53 (2007) (noting that content of the Internet
includes "dozens of sites that espouse hatred of blacks, homosexuals, and Jews"). Indeed, federal
law expressly exempts broadband providers from editorial responsibility over the Internet content
they transmit from one user to another, and immunizes them from state law claims based upon such
transmissions. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) ("no cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section");
Herman, supra note 203, at 113 (noting that this statute specifically provides that Internet service
providers are not editors).
209. See Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 215 (must-carry regulation of cable systems did not
"represent a significant First Amendment harm" because systems would have carried most affected
channels "in the absence of any legal obligation to do so") (citation omitted). For example, in 2006,
the President of the United States Telecom Association addressed net neutrality concerns by making
a public commitment to Congress that the association's member companies "will not block, impair,
or degrade content" even in the absence of net neutrality. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce. Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 1 (Feb. 7, 2006) (testimony of Walter B.
McCormick, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Telecom Ass'n), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/mccormick-020706.pdf. The President of the National Cable &
Telecommunications Association similarly represented to Congress that "no one has yet identified"
cases of discrimination against Internet content in the "real world" without net neutrality regulation
that would suggest that "government intervention" was needed. Net Neutrality: HearingBefore the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 4 (Feb. 7, 2006) (testimony of Kyle
McSlarrow, President & CEO, National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n), available at
6
2
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/mcslarrow-0 070 .pdf.
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Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will

forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
,,210
gives. 0 Madison thought a democratic press to be worthy of protection
against the states, as well as Congress.21 ' Jefferson, similarly, believed
that to ward off tyranny required that the people receive "'full
information of their affairs thro' the channel of the public papers,
and... that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the
people.' ' 2 12 Jefferson thought freedom of the press served to "fortify the
habit of testing everything by reason. 21 3 Learning and communication
were the very ends for which civilization was established, so the "right
of free correspondence between citizen and citizen, on their joint
21 4
interests, whether public or private," is a "natural right.,
As with blog trademark cases and eBook copyright cases, the
common law in 1791 may also provide an instructive point of departure
for analyzing assertions of a First Amendment right of access to digital
media over broadband. When the First Amendment was ratified, local
monopolies of the type inherited by many cable and DSL broadband
providers were frequently, although not always, regarded as unlawful at
common law.2 15 The common law protected the freedom of the
210. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 57, at 103.
211. The second sentence of the First Amendment as introduced by Madison stated: "No State
shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases."
4 ANNALS
OF CONGRESS
934 (1794),
available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendlspeechsl4.html; see also David A. Anderson, The
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 483 (1983).
212. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.16 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), reprintedin 11 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (J. Boyd ed., 1955)).
213. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge John Tyler (June 28, 1804), in JEFFERSON:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 271 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=6rOu3WYEiiQC&pg=PA27 I&lpg=PA271 &dq=%22fortify+the
+habit+of+testing+everything+by+reason%22&source=web&ots=FjUBoJDOSb&sig=Dvmyw82Yb
ukTDV6m4jBdSFNR5YO.
214. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel James Monroe in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 422 (Library ed. 1903). Nature itself seemed to Jefferson to have intended ideas to
spread "freely" from one person to another "over the globe, for the ... instruction of man, and
improvement of his condition." Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1966)
(quoting 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1855)).
215. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54 (1911) ("[B]y the common
law monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon individual freedom of contract and
their injury to the public."); see also Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v.
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter House Co., Ill U.S. 746, 761 (1884) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (declaring an "incontrovertible proposition of both English and American public law,
that all mere monopolies are odious and against common right"); People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago
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individual to practice any lawful trade, contrary to attempts to
concentrate the trade and its benefits in a few hands. 216 Its legacy should
Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E. 798, 803 (I11.1889) ("All grants creating monopolies are made void by the
common law.") (citations omitted); id. at 293 ("Whatever tends to create a monopoly is unlawful, as
being contrary to public policy.") (citations omitted); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155,
160 (Neb. 1890) ("Whatever tends to destroy competition and create a monopoly is contrary to
public policy, and therefore unlawful.") (citations omitted); People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 121
N.Y. 582, 625 (1890) (ordering dissolution of corporation at common law because "if corporations
can combine..., without limit to the magnitude of the aggregation, a tempting and easy road is
opened to enormous combinations" that could overpower "individual ownership"); State ex rel.
Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 290 (Ohio 1892) ("Monopolies have always been
regarded as contrary to the spirit and policy of the common law.") (citing Darcy v. Allein, [1602] 77
Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.)); E. India Co. v. Sandys (The Great Case of Monopolies), 10 St. Tr. 371, 538
(1683) ("[T]hough monopolies are forbidden, yet that cannot be understood to be so universally
true, (as no general law can ever be) that it should in no respect, and upon no occasion or emergency
whatsoever, admit of any exception or limitation."); In re Clothworkers of Ipswich, [1615] 78 Eng.
Rep. 147, 148 (K.B.) ("[lit was agreed by the Court, that the King might make corporations,.., but
thereby they cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away free-trade, which is the birthright of
every subject."); Darcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1265-66 (explaining that the common law
invalidated attempt to convey national monopoly over manufacture or importation of playing cards);
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND
OTHER PLEASE OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 181 (6th ed. 1985) (1641), available at

http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/
grants of
("[A]II
sceti/printedbooksNew/index.cfm?TextlD=cokeinsts3&PagePosition= 191
monopolies are against the ancient and fundamental [sic] laws of this kingdome [sic] .... "); James
Madison, Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations.EcclesiasticalEndowments, reprinted in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 58, at 756 (declaring that the U.S. Constitution restricted official
monopolies to "two cases, the authors of Books, and of useful inventions"); Edward G. Buckland,
Combinations and Trusts, 16 NEW ENGLANDER AND YALE REV. 343, 352 (1890) ("In the infancy of
this nation, the disposition was to regard with suspicion any approach to facilitating corporate
organization ....

The old memories of English monopolies still lingered ....

").

216. See Beall v. Beck, 2 F. Cas. 1111, 1114 (C.C.D.C. 1829) (No. 1,161) ("Wherever the
privilege of [a] landlord would destroy a lawful trade or occupation which is useful to the public, it
is restrained by law."); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 548, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3,230) (holding that a law restricting any person not an "actual inhabitant and resident" of New
Jersey from practicing fisherman's trade violated Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution because it restricted ability of citizens of the United States "to acquire ... property,"
"pursue and obtain happiness," and engage in a lawful "trade, agriculture, [or] professional
pursuit[]"); Mayor of Memphis v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. 707, 709-10 (1848) (striking down
discriminatory curfew imposed on African-Americans as contrary to their "liberty" because "in
cities, very often, the most profitable employment is to be found in the night"); Darcy v. Allein, 77
Eng. Rep. at 1262-63 (declaring monopolies to be contrary to the "benefit and liberty of the
subject"); MAGNA CARTA sec. 41, 1215, reprinted in JAMES C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 327 (1965)

("All merchants are to be safe and secure ... to buy and sell free from all maletotes [impositions] by
the ancient and rightful customs."); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 415 (1765) ("At the common law, every man might use what trade he pleased."); 3 COKE,
INSTITUTES, supra note 215, at 181 ("[A] Monopolist that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his
life .... ); James Madison, Property, reprinted in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 58, at
515-16 ("That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary restrictions,
exemptions, and monopolies deny to a part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free
choice of their occupations .. "); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 373 (1886)
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force advocates of preserving unregulated broadband monopolies and
oligopolies to bear the heavy burden of establishing how such monopoly
power over the means of public debate can possibly be reconciled with
the common law tradition of individual liberty.
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1791, when the First Amendment was ratified, the press had wide
latitude under the common law to print material that might today be
considered to be outside the scope of the freedom of speech. From the
standpoint of the areas of law addressed in this Article, citizens had a
comparatively more expansive right to engage in political and cultural
communication, despite the social and technological limitations of the
time. First, trademark law remained strictly limited to core cases of
"passing off' between commercial competitors actively engaged in
advertising and promotion.' 7 Second, a generous right to imitate and
copy from copyrighted works in preparing new works was recognized
under the common law of copyright, as a way of assuring authors and the
public of the ability to read and reuse other authors' books without
having to grovel for permission, quaver with fear of being enjoined for a
quotation, or pay a license fee for the privilege of speaking. 218 Finally,
the common law guaranteed each citizen the liberty of practicing a
21 9
legitimate trade or enterprise free from official monopolies.
By hearkening back to the common law and articulating originalist
principles of constitutional, intellectual property, and antitrust law,

Internet freedom can be founded upon a surer footing than the ad hoc
balancing that characterizes contemporary cyberlaw scholarship and
judicial decisions. Specifically, demanding freedom of speech at least
equal to that exercised in Britain and North America in 1791 can
preserve Internet users' access to voices and digital technologies
threatened by overbroad assertions of copyright, trademark, or
telecommunications licensing interests. Moreover, returning antitrust law
to its original foundations in the liberty of the subject, suspicion of
(law conferring upon city government the "arbitrary power" to withhold the right to carry on a trade
violated Equal Protection Clause: "[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold ...any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable
in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."); Timothy Sandefur,
The Common Law Right to Earn a Living, 7 INDEP. REV. 69, 70 (2002) ("In 1377, the court struck
down a royal monopoly on the sale of wine in London that had been granted to a man named John
Peachie. The court held this grant to violate the right of free trade.").
217.

See supra Part ll.B.

218. See supra Part III.B.
219. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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concentrated public or private power, and insistence on vigorous price
and quality competition promises to roll back recent Supreme Court
decisions celebrating monopoly power in a variety of contexts critical to
digital media, most notably telecommunications and Internet
infrastructure. A First Amendment that accounts for the freedom
guaranteed by the common law would mandate the breakup of private
tyrannies over information, and the liberation of audiences from
monopoly control over the instrumentalities of free speech.
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